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The undocumented migration of Mexican nationals to the U.S. is largely influenced 
by labor demand in low-skill sectors.  The legal migration channels available to Mexican 
nationals with little education are based on family petitions and subject to visa quotas 
which are dwarfed by the demand for entry to the United States; visa approval can take 
upwards of 20 years for a Mexican national with little education and few resources.  Thus, 
undocumented immigration is a more responsive unskilled labor distribution mechanism 
than the existing quota-based immigration policy.  However, the restrictive legal 
migration channels and increased costs of undocumented migration are stifling the 
movement of low-skill Mexican migrants, who constitute the majority share of foreign-
born, low-skill workers in the U.S.   
This thesis explores the impact of a market-based immigration system for Mexican 
nationals, wherein any Mexican national can receive a visa to live and work indefinitely 
in the U.S. at a price.  The effects of such a policy are analyzed using a partial 
equilibrium model of U.S. agriculture and a computable general equilibrium model of the 





immigration policy will result in $5.7-$6.8 billion in revenues for the U.S. government, 
growth of $6.5-$30 billion in U.S. legally-documented workers’ earnings as a whole—
with larger, positive impacts on high-skilled wages in the U.S., and large productivity 
gains for U.S. producers in all sectors.  Overall, the positive effects in the U.S. economy 
grant validity to a market-based immigration policy as an alternative to the current quota-





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The face of unskilled labor in the United States is changing dramatically as the rate of 
immigration rises steadily over time.  In the United States, a majority of the total 
domestic working population—approximately 66 percent—is educated beyond high 
school and works in mid- to high-skill industries (BLS, 2015).  Many low-skill-intensive 
sectors, especially the most labor-intensive sectors in agricultural production, are affected 
by labor shortages.  Working conditions are often too physically challenging, and 
compensation is insufficient to appeal to domestic workers, whose wage elasticity of 
labor supply is often too inelastic to employ at competitive prices in unskilled industries 
(Taylor, 2010; Taylor et al., 2012).  Increasingly, unskilled immigrant workers have 
become vital for the expansion of low-skill sectors and all sectors dependent on the 
productivity of low-skilled sectors (Guan et al., 2015). 
A majority of the total foreign-born unskilled population is of Mexican origin (Passel 
and Cohn, 2015a).  According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey, an estimated 
68 percent of U.S. agriculture’s total labor force is Mexican-born (Taylor et al., 2012).  
Historically, unskilled Mexican migrants have consisted primarily of young, unmarried 





are now migrating to the U.S. seeking permanent residence in urban settings and 
employment in unskilled sectors outside of agriculture (Hanson, 2006).   
Net Mexican migration rates were substantially positive after a series of immigration 
policy shifts in the mid-to-late 1980s, largely due to an influx of undocumented 
immigrants.  However, the most recent estimates indicate that net Mexican migration is 
approximately zero, and has been shrinking since the beginning of 2010 (Gonzalez-
Barrera, 2015).  Legal unskilled labor migration from Mexico is largely constricted by a 
quota-based immigration policy, leaving undocumented immigration as the only 
migration channel for most unskilled Mexican nationals.  Due to the lack of regulation, 
this immigration channel is extremely responsive to the labor market in the United States.  
Widespread unemployment in non-agriculture, low-skill industries following the 2008 
financial crisis led to a precipitous decline in the rate of Mexico-U.S. migration: from 25 
migrants per thousand Mexican nationals in 2005 to seven per thousand in 2012 
(Villarreal, 2014).   
Even among the remaining undocumented immigrants, it is estimated that only five 
percent seek employment in the U.S. agriculture sector (Passel and Cohn, 2015a).  The 
slowing of unskilled Mexican migration to the U.S., in conjunction with unskilled 
migrants’ employment preferences shifting away from U.S. agriculture, implies that 
immigration reform may be necessary to satisfy the unskilled, agricultural labor demand 
in the United States.  This thesis models and analyzes the U.S. labor market impacts of 
establishing a market-based immigration policy for Mexican nationals that is not subject 





Understanding the impacts of immigration policy must begin with an examination of 
undocumented Mexican immigrants.  Due to the complicated nature of crossing the 
highly-monitored U.S.-Mexico border, most illegal immigration occurs with the help of 
guides, known as “coyotes1” or “polleros2,” who smuggle migrants across the border.  
The migrant-smuggling industry is expensive and highly responsive to increases in the 
intensity of border enforcement (Roberts et al. 2010).  As border security increases, so 
does the financial cost of illegal migration; however, most undocumented Mexican 
immigrants are willing to pay large amounts for border-crossing guides rather than forego 
the relatively large benefits of living and working in the United States.  Since Mexican 
migrants are already paying a steep fee for an unregulated, dangerous, and illegal service, 
it is likely they would be willing to pay even more for a legal, secure manner to access 
the U.S. unskilled labor market.  This is the foundational rationale for creating a market-
based immigration system. 
 
1.2 Research Design 
This thesis consists of an analysis of the U.S. labor market response to endogenous 
unskilled labor movement from Mexico to the U.S. caused by replacing the current 
quota-based immigration system with a market-based system for Mexican nationals.  
Here, I use two economic modelling approaches to analyze the labor market and welfare 
impacts of such an immigration reform, focusing specifically on undocumented Mexican 
immigrants living in the U.S. in both models.  The simulations in both models eliminate 
                                                 
1 “Coyotes” are brokers for immigrant smuggling services, more common in highly-organized smuggler 
groups. 
2 “Polleros” (literally “chicken herders”) are immigrant guides that walk with undocumented immigrants 





the current immigration system (based on the Immigration Act of 1990) that uses visa 
quotas to limit legal immigration of Mexican citizens.  This quota system is replaced by a 
fee system in which any non-criminal Mexican citizen willing and able to pay is eligible 
for legal entry to the U.S. within a reasonable time frame.3 
First, I use a partial equilibrium model, drawing on prior work by Baldos and Hertel 
(2012), to analyze the U.S. agriculture labor market impacts of a market-based visa4 
distribution scheme for low-skill Mexican nationals.  The inefficiency of low-skill labor 
distribution across the United States and Mexico—a consequence of the current, 
restrictive immigration policy—is represented as a specific tax on the agricultural wages 
of Mexican nationals.  When this additive tax on Mexican agricultural wages is reduced 
to zero, the economic relationships in the partial equilibrium model reflect the 
implementation of an economic union between the two countries; here, there exists free 
flow of labor and capital, and cost-of-living adjusted wages equated across regions.  
Therefore, I induce an endogenous migration decision by reducing the additive tax on 
Mexican agricultural wages by varying amounts, reflecting a variety of visa pricing 
schemes, and analyze the responsiveness of Mexican nationals and the economic impacts 
in the U.S. agriculture sector. 
Second, I use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, namely the Global 
Migration model with Undocumented Immigrants (GMig2-U), developed by the Global 
                                                 
3 As a frame of reference, under the current quota-based immigration policy, in June 2016, the group of 
Mexican nationals that most recently received an F1, F2B, F3, and F4 family-sponsored visa applied for it 
in Feb. 1995, Sep. 1995, Oct. 1994, and Apr. 1997, respectively.  These individuals were “in line” for a 
visa for 19 to 21 years.  Note: F2A visa priority date is Sep. 2014, although this visa category is not subject 
to per-country visa limits, and very few Mexican nationals qualify for application (USCIS, 2016). 
4 Note: I use the word “visa” to reference permanent residency in the United States, colloquially known as a 






Trade Analysis Project at Purdue University to analyze the general equilibrium effects of 
this proposed immigration policy (see Aguiar, 2009; Aguiar and Walmsley, 2013; 
Walmsley, Winters, and Ahmed, 2007).  The GMig2-U model accounts for the labor 
market participation and remittance-sending behaviors of migrants worldwide.  
Additionally, GMig2-U represents the employment and behaviors of undocumented 
immigrants in the United States.  I introduce an endogenous migration decision and 
account for the migrant smuggling industry along the U.S.-Mexico border.  Migration 
patterns from Mexico to the U.S. are endogenously determined by the model in response 
to changes in labor demand; in this context, we can explore the implications of switching 
to a market-based immigration system. 
The price to enter the United States under this new system is determined by an 
approximation of the willingness to pay of low-skilled Mexican nationals to migrate 
legally.  Thus, this final price incorporates the direct and indirect costs of migrating 
illegally.  The direct costs include smugglers’ fees, the opportunity cost of missed 
employment in Mexico, and a cost-of-living adjustment. The indirect costs include the 
opportunity cost of unused land in Mexico, the disutility of being far from home and 
family, the inherent risks involved in migrating illegally, and the disutility of living and 
working as an undocumented immigrant in the U.S.   
This thesis attempts to understand the economic consequences of implementing a 
price-based immigration system for Mexican nationals and it will be of interest to 
researchers in the fields of immigration economics, labor economics, international 





feasible in the near term, this analysis will provide a useful platform from which to 
address many issues missing from the literature on illegal immigration.   
1.3 Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1: What are the partial equilibrium effects on U.S. agriculture of a 
market-based immigration policy? 
Hypothesis 1: U.S. agriculture employment of Mexican nationals will increase 
substantially, U.S. agriculture wages will decrease substantially, and Mexican agriculture 
wages will increase marginally. 
Research Question 2: Who will benefit most from a market-based immigration policy: 
Mexican immigrants living in the U.S., Mexican nationals remaining in Mexico, or U.S. 
employers? 
Hypothesis 2: U.S. employers will benefit the most; this benefit will come from a 
large decrease in low-skill wages. 
Research Question 3: Will Mexican demand for U.S. visas dramatically change if the 
visa price is increased from the level of average smuggler fees to some larger amount? 
Hypothesis 3: An increase in the price of visas under this market-based immigration 
policy will not dramatically change the demand for U.S. visas by Mexican nationals, 
because demand for access to the U.S. labor market is inelastic. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review, including a summary of the most relevant 
immigration policy, the immigrant smuggling industry, factors in the decision by 





labor market impacts of undocumented immigrants in the United States.  Chapter 3 
presents an explanation of the data used in this study and the conceptual model 
motivating the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models.  Chapter 4 presents 
the partial equilibrium model used to study the U.S. agriculture labor market impacts of a 
market-based immigration policy for Mexican nationals.  Chapter 5 presents the 
computable general equilibrium model used to examine this immigration policy shift, 
with an explanation of general equilibrium welfare effects.  Finally, Chapter 6 concludes 





CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 A Background to U.S. Immigration Policy 
Undocumented Mexican migration to the United States occurred often during the 19th 
and 20th Centuries, especially during war-induced domestic labor shortages.  However, 
the growth in sheer volume of undocumented Mexican migration in recent decades 
follows major shifts in U.S. immigration policy, most notably the U.S. Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Immigration Act of 1990, and the increased 
militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border after 1993.  The following is a review of the 
impacts of these immigration policies, according to the relevant literature. 
 
2.1.1 U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
The modern era of immigration policy in the United States began with the U.S. 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which sought to deter illegal 
immigration into the United States.  IRCA was a three-part approach, consisting of: 
granting legal status to approximately 2.7 million undocumented immigrants living in the 
U.S. (1.6 million were able to prove they lived in the U.S. since before 1982 and 1.1 
million who applied under special agricultural worker, or SAW, status; the remaining 
500,000 undocumented immigrants in the U.S. did not qualify for the legal status 





increase for the agency then known as the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
or INS5), and implementing sanctions on U.S. employers who hire undocumented 
workers (Woodrow and Passel, 1990).  An estimated 2 million of the IRCA beneficiaries 
were Mexican immigrants (Hanson, 2006).   
As part of the IRCA, employers were required to file an I-9 form stating that each 
employee submitted sufficient evidence of their employment eligibility in the United 
States.  Employers faced civil and criminal sanctions for knowingly hiring unauthorized 
workers (Donato, Durand, and Massey, 1992).  However, undocumented immigrants 
were able to use fraudulent employment eligibility paperwork to circumvent this law 
since very little effort was directed at verifying the legitimacy of most documents.  An 
estimated half of all undocumented immigrant hires between 1986 and 1994 fulfilled the 
paperwork requirements of IRCA superficially—i.e., using fraudulent identification 
documents (Lowell and Jing, 2004).   
As a consequence, rather than deny employment to undocumented immigrants, 
employers were more likely to reduce wages of undocumented workers as a way to hedge 
the risk of incurring sanctions (Phillips and Massey, 1999).  Especially in agriculture, 
employers shifted toward using labor subcontractors to hire undocumented workers 
(Taylor and Thilmany, 1993).  Under this arrangement, the undocumented workers are 
not technically hired by the employer, so the risk of non-IRCA-compliance penalties is 
avoided.  Phillips and Massey (1999) find that employment through a labor subcontractor, 
post-IRCA is connected to a 23 percent penalty on undocumented worker wages, since 
                                                 
5 The INS ceased to exist in 2003.  Its functions were split among three agencies: the U.S. Citizenship and 






“subcontractors assumed the risks of prosecution under IRCA and absorbed the costs of 
IRCA-mandated paperwork.”   
The intention of IRCA was to reduce the undocumented population, prevent future 
undocumented immigration through the U.S.-Mexico border, and force the remaining 
undocumented population to emigrate by making it difficult to find employment.  
However, the lax enforcement of employer sanctions meant that IRCA made no impact 
on undocumented immigrant flows to the U.S. at best (Donato, Durand, and Massey, 
1992), and the expectation of future amnesty programs increased levels of undocumented 
immigration at worst (Hanson, 2006).  IRCA significantly lowered wages for 
undocumented immigrants; legal status post-IRCA became the most important 
determinant of wage levels—more important than education, English speaking ability, 
and social capital (Phillips and Massey, 1999).  Rather than deter undocumented 
immigrants from seeking employment, lower wages led to higher work effort from 
undocumented Mexican workers, which made them more productive per worker at a 
lower price than domestic or documented laborers (Davila, Pagan, and Grau, 1998). 
 
2.1.2 The Immigration Act of 1990 
The post-IRCA expansion of undocumented, low-skilled immigration prompted a 
desire to expand the total number of U.S. visas distributed.  The Immigration Act of 1990, 
which amended the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965, created the currently-enforced system under 
which U.S. immigrant visa quotas are allocated to most countries based on the total 





introduced a higher visa cap at 675,000 individuals annually, 480,000 of which are 
designated for relatives of U.S. citizens or permanent legal residents (USCIS, 2016).   
The priority of these family-based visa applications is ranked by the applicant’s 
proximity to the U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident sponsoring the application; the 
highest application rank is given to spouses and children, and the lowest application rank 
is given to married, adult siblings.  Although many Mexican nationals qualify for a 
family-based visa (due to the large-scale legalization of Mexican family members under 
IRCA), Mexico’s demand for U.S. visas vastly outnumbers the allocation.  This is 
evident in the Visa Bulletin, which states that in June 2016, the visa applications that 
were most recently-approved were filed by Mexican nationals in the mid-1990s, 
compared to the global average of mid-to-late-2000s (USCIS, 2016).   
Inefficiency in the legal migration system for Mexican nationals is responsible for the 
dramatic increase of undocumented immigration rates into the 1990s and beyond.  
Mexican demand for visas is so large that the U.S. government allows undocumented 
immigrants currently living in the U.S. to adjust their legal status without penalty 
(Hanson, 2006).  Consequently, many Mexican nationals “in line” for a visa think of 
living in the U.S. illegally as a temporary step in the legalization process.   
 
2.1.3 Post-1993 Militarized Border Protection Strategy 
In response to the rapid expansion of undocumented Mexican immigration into the 
U.S., the Clinton Administration expanded the INS budget from $1.5 billion in 1993 to 
$4 billion in 1999, with total spending on border enforcement growing from just over 





the U.S. Border Patrol more than doubled the size of the total number of border 
enforcement officials by the year 2000, reaching 9,212 agents by that year (Cornelius, 
2001).  Total enforcement hours on the U.S.-Mexico border increased by 300 percent 
between 1992 and 2001, and by 45 percent between 2001 and 2008 (Roberts et al., 2010).   
Border enforcement became increasingly militarized during this period, with the 
implementation of stadium-style lighting, infrared night scopes, motion sensors buried 
underground with cameras that automatically follow any recorded movement, military-
grade communications equipment, helicopters, all-terrain vehicles, and IDENT, a 
database system for tracking apprehended individuals through photographs and 
fingerprint records (Andreas, 2001).  In addition, 10-foot, reinforced steel fences were 
added to the border along high-traffic areas (on a total of 76 miles of the border by the 
year 2001).  Border patrol officials were also stationed in more concentrated patterns 
along high-traffic corridors (mainly around San Diego, Calexico, El Paso, and the 
southern Texas-Mexico border) to deter illegal immigration in those areas.  This border 
protection plan was implemented in various phases, beginning with the high-intensity 
locations. 
Operation “Hold-the-Line”6, the first high-profile immigration strategy of the Clinton 
Administration, began on a 20-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico Border near El Paso, 
Texas in September 1993.  This intensified border patrol approach significantly reduced 
attempted migration in the area, which normally faced undocumented immigrant flows of 
10,000 individuals per day (Andreas, 2001).  This led to a continuation of the “prevention 
                                                 





through deterrence” border strategy, consisting of the implementation of similar high-
intensity border strategies along other high-traffic corridors of the U.S.-Mexico border.   
Operation “Gatekeeper” began along a 14-mile stretch of the border surrounding the 
San Diego, California area in October 1994.  It was employed in three phases, the last of 
which extended the protected area to Yuma, Arizona.  Operation “Safeguard” began in 
1994 with the intention of protecting the Arizona border, but was not substantially funded 
until 1999.  Operation “Rio Grande” began in 1997 along the south Rio Grande Valley in 
Texas (Cornelius, 2001). 
While these border fortification strategies increased the total number of 
apprehensions in high-traffic corridors, immigrants adjusted to the more-difficult 
conditions by traversing less-monitored routes and hiring professional smugglers to guide 
them across the border.  Most illegal migration flows were redistributed to the 
unmonitored portions of Arizona and western New Mexico, namely areas of vast desert 
or mountainous terrain (Andreas, 2001).  In fact, a migration scholar claims that 
approximately 70-80 percent of illegal migrants that attempt crossing the U.S.-Mexico 
border are eventually successful—despite the post-1993 border enforcement hike—due in 
large part to the organizational response of the migrant smuggling industry (Cornelius, 
2001).   
 
2.2 The Immigrant Smuggling Industry 
The U.S. border patrol and Mexican immigrant smugglers exist in an “unintentionally 
symbiotic” relationship whereby the increased difficulty in illegal immigration increases 





undocumented immigration to the U.S. formed a routine part of Mexican (male) 
immigrants’ seasonal employment in agriculture.  Very few Mexican nationals used 
smuggler services to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.  Those who used smugglers were 
primarily “special needs” migrants, such as women traveling with children, elderly 
immigrants, or first-time immigrants with no family or community connections in the U.S. 
(Andreas, 2001).  However, IRCA dramatically increased both the costs and benefits of 
illegal immigration to the U.S., fueling a sharp increase in smuggler demand (Lopez 
Castro, 1998). 
The subsequent militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border in the 1990s exacerbated 
smuggler demand.  The increased difficulty and risks in illegally crossing the border led 
to increased smuggler fees.  Mexican nationals, on average, began paying double or triple 
the amount paid in 1990, a phenomenon that had a “strong negative effect on the 
probability of returning to one’s home country,” according to multivariate analysis by 
Cornelius (2001).  Mexican men shifted away from immigrating to the U.S. for 
temporary employment in agriculture, and toward permanent employment in low-skill, 
non-agriculture industries (Hanson, 2006).  In response to the permanent relocation, more 
Mexican families began crossing illegally into the U.S. to reunite with household heads.  
Whereas smugglers were once optional for Mexican immigrants, the militarization of the 
border made them a necessity for successful crossing in the late 1990s. This effectively 
fueled a transformation of the Mexican immigrant smuggling industry (Andreas, 2001; 
Dolfin and Genicot, 2010; Gathmann, 2008; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999; Izcara 





Since the late 1990s there has emerged an apparent division of the migrant smuggling 
sector into two market structures: small-scale, part-time smugglers that mainly transport 
migrants looking for agricultural employment in the U.S., characterized by a relatively 
free entry/exit with few fixed costs (hereby referred to as perfectly-competitive 
smugglers), and large-scale, full-time smugglers that mainly transport migrants looking 
for non-agricultural employment in the U.S. incur significant fixed costs associated with 
establishing their network, differentiating the service which they offer and establishing a 
reputation for success (hereby referred to as monopolistically-competitive smugglers).   
Perfectly-competitive smugglers typically guide young Mexican men looking for 
employment in agriculture (Izcara Palacios, 2012; Lopez Castro, 1998).  They look for 
the same size of group for travel, usually between 1 and 5 individuals (Izcara Palacios, 
2012).  Most travel to the U.S. no more than four times a year, and a majority only travel 
once a year for their own seasonal agriculture employment (Izcara Palacios, 2012). 
In the monopolistically-competitive enterprises, smugglers invest heavily in building 
their network and contacts and then recoup their costs via a sizable markup over the 
marginal cost of smuggling an individual migrant across the border (Roberts et al., 2010; 
Izcara Palacios, 2012; Spener, 2011).  Migrants can pay off the steeper fee by working in 
an arranged job provided by the smuggler (Andreas, 2001; Garsd, 2016).  These 
smugglers benefit from economies of scale; hence, multiple border crossing attempts are 
guaranteed as part of a “package deal,” which small-scale smugglers cannot provide 
(Garsd, 2016).  These smugglers are highly-organized, and are capable of crossing large 
groups (upwards of 40 people at a time) through highly-guarded portions of the border; 





They make multiple trips to the U.S. every week, year-round (Izcara Palacios, 2012).  To 
these smugglers, consumer satisfaction is very important, since immigrant networks 
influence future business (Andreas, 2001; Izcara Palacios, 2012).  As a result, many 
immigrants feel safer traveling with the monopolistically-competitive smugglers.  These 
smugglers depend on an extensive network of informants, mainly on the Mexican side, 
but also including potential U.S. employers, other smugglers, and U.S. border patrol 
authorities (Izcara Palacios, 2012). 
Before the militarized border protection strategy, the highly-organized, 
monopolistically-competitive smugglers specialized in the smuggling of non-Mexicans; 
mostly Central American and Chinese immigrants used these services, while Mexican 
immigrants crossed alone or with the guidance of low-scale, local-level (perfectly-
competitive) smugglers (Andreas, 2001).  However, the intensification of border patrol 
efforts since 1993 has made undocumented Mexican migrants almost entirely dependent 
on highly-organized, monopolistically-competitive smugglers.  Today, monopolistically-
competitive smugglers control the overwhelming majority of the smuggling service 
market (Spener, 2011). 
As border protection has intensified, smuggling prices have skyrocketed—one 
prominent smuggler reports increasing his guidance fee from $50 in 1990 (nominal price; 
equal to $90 in 2015 USD) to $5,000 in 2015 for crossing the Rio Grande on the southern 
Texas-Mexico border (Garsd, 2016).  Prices vary widely, but large-scale, 
monopolistically-competitive smugglers with better reputation are more expensive 






2.3 Undocumented Mexican Immigration to the United States 
Today, an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants live in the U.S., and 
approximately 3.59 million of these are economically active (i.e. working), Mexican-born 
individuals (Passel and Cohn, 2015a).  For unskilled Mexican nationals, motivation for 
undocumented migration comes from the U.S.-Mexican wage differential; shocks to 
either of the two economies are quickly taken into account in the migration decision 
(Hanson, 2006).  Extensive family and community networks in the U.S. allow for 
relatively immediate transmission of information, including availability of employment 
and housing in the U.S. (Munshi, 2003).  Another important motivation for 
undocumented migration is family reunification, which occurs when the family head is 
employed in a perceivably permanent position in the U.S. and is able to finance high-cost 
smuggling services for the remaining family members in Mexico (Ryo, 2013). 
U.S. immigration and trade policy also impacted undocumented immigration from 
Mexico.  Taylor and colleagues (2012) conclude that increased border enforcement 
expenditure did not affect undocumented Mexican migration to U.S. farms.  This 
suggests that either new migrants were not deterred or current undocumented immigrants 
returned to Mexico less often.  However, IRCA and NAFTA impacted undocumented 
Mexican migration to U.S. agriculture positively; Taylor and colleagues (2012) estimate 
that 40 percent of the undocumented employment growth in U.S. agriculture from 1986 
to 2002 can be explained by the implementation of these two policies. 
Undocumented immigrants are more likely to send remittances home than legal 
immigrants, since legal immigrants are more likely to travel with their immediate family 





approximately 2.2 percent of Mexico’s GDP, up from 0.1 percent of Mexico’s GDP in 
1990 (Maldonado, Bajuk, and Hayem, 2012).  This is due to the increase in 
undocumented Mexican immigrant population in the U.S. over this time period.  
Remittances have significant multiplier effects, especially for rural communities in 
Mexico, which allows for increased investment in physical capital and schooling (Taylor 
and Martin, 2001).  Remittance-sending behaviors vary widely by individual, but 
consistently fall over time, and substantially decrease after reunification with immediate 
family (Ryo, 2013).  Remittances from members of a family or community network often 
pay for smuggling services if the family plans on moving permanently to the U.S. (Ryo, 
2013). 
 
2.4 The Labor Market for Undocumented Immigrants 
An estimated four percent of undocumented immigrants work in U.S. agriculture; the 
remainder are employed in low-skill, non-agriculture sectors, namely construction, 
manufacturing, food service, and accommodation services (Passel and Cohn, 2015a).  
Mexican-born immigrants represent 68 percent of the agriculture labor market, and 68 
percent of Mexican-born agriculture workers are currently undocumented (Taylor et al., 
2012).  Considering that labor costs represent approximately 38 percent of agriculture 
production costs in the U.S., undocumented Mexican immigrant labor represents 
approximately 17 percent of the total production costs in U.S. agriculture as an industry 
average (Hertel et al., 2012).  Buccola, Li, and Reimer (2011) approximate the labor 





an estimated labor supply elasticity equal to 5.15, indicating that the agriculture labor 
supply, which consists in majority of immigrants, is highly elastic. 
The supply of undocumented immigrant labor from Mexico is equivalent to the 
excess supply of unskilled labor in Mexico.  In Mexico, Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005) 
find that the labor demand elasticity for “blue-collar,” i.e. low-skill, workers is -0.3, and -
0.28 for “white-collar,” i.e. high-skill, workers.  This means that a 10 percent increase in 
Mexican wages will decrease the total quantity of labor demanded by 3 percent for low-
skill industries and by 2.8 percent for high-skill industries in Mexico.  Meanwhile, 
Hanson (2007) uses Mexican employment data from 1990 to 2000, and estimates the 
elasticity of wages with respect to the local labor supply ranges from 0.7 to 0.8.  This 
indicates that a 1 percent increase in quantity of labor supplied is associated with an 
increase in wages of 0.7-0.8 percent.  Using Houck’s (1965) interpretation, the elasticity 
of labor supply with respect to wages is equal to the reciprocal, i.e., ranging from 1.25 to 
1.43.  This means that a 1 percent increase in Mexican wages will increase the total 
quantity of labor supplied by 1.25 to 1.43 percent, as an average of all Mexican industries. 
The effects of low-skill immigrants on domestic wages in the U.S. labor market have 
gained nuance as more research addresses this question.  Borjas (2003) analyzes 
employment data from 1960 to 2001 to estimate the native worker wage impacts of 
immigrant shocks, based on varying skill levels (proxied by education attainment) and 
work experience (proxied by age of worker).  Immigrants and native workers of similar 
education and experience are closer substitutes than immigrants and native workers over 
all education and experience levels (Borjas, 2003).  The native worker wage flexibility 





low-skilled immigrant workers reduces low-skilled domestic worker wages by 4 percent 
(Borjas, 2003).  Dixon, Johnson, and Rimmer (2011) analyzed the economic effects of 
low-skill immigrants in the U.S. using a general equilibrium model.  They conclude that a 
reduction of undocumented workers by increasing total U.S. border security spending 
places downward pressure on legal (i.e. domestic or legally-documented immigrant) U.S. 
wages as a whole.  Dixon, Rimmer, and Roberts (2014) augment this research by 
separating the effects of low-skill immigrant workers on domestic U.S. workers by skill 
type.  They conclude that an increase in undocumented workers in low-skill industries 
places downward pressure on legal U.S. low-skilled wages, but opens opportunities in 
high-skill industries.  As a result, higher numbers of low-skill, undocumented immigrants 
increase total U.S. GDP.   
Finally, Aguiar and Walmsley (2013) use a general equilibrium model to analyze the 
economic implications of a full deportation of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the 
U.S., compared with full legalization of these individuals.  They determine that a full 
deportation of undocumented Mexican immigrants would increase domestic low-skill 
wages by half a percent, but decrease domestic skilled wages by 0.38 percent and 
decrease U.S. GDP by 0.61 percent.  In contrast, full legalization of undocumented 
Mexican immigrants would decrease domestic low-skill wages by 0.41 percent, increase 
domestic skilled wages by 0.35 percent, and increase total U.S. GDP by 0.53 percent.  
Overall, the literature concludes that low-skilled, undocumented immigrants have a 
competitive effect on low-skill domestic wages, but a complimentary effect on high-skill 





CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Conceptual Model 
This section outlines the economic principles of the immigration policy shift that I 
will implement in the partial equilibrium model in Chapter 4 and the computable general 
equilibrium model in Chapter 5.  Fundamentally, a market-based immigration policy will 
involve three parties: Mexican nationals who are potential immigrants to the United 
States, illegal immigrant smugglers at the U.S.-Mexico border who provide an alternative 
to the legal migration option, and U.S. employers who ultimately drive the demand for 
access to the U.S. unskilled labor market. 
 
3.1.1 Migration Decision Framework 
In this framework, Mexican nationals are assumed to make a rational migration 
decision that takes into account the benefit of migrating to the U.S. (i.e., potential U.S. 
income) and compares its value to the (direct and indirect) costs of migrating illegally.  I 
define the potential U.S. annual income faced by undocumented Mexican immigrants in 





where 𝑌 ,  is the potential annual income earned by undocumented immigrants in the 
United States for sector s (i.e. Ag or Non-ag), 𝑌  is the annual income currently earned 
by Mexican nationals in sector s, 𝑌 ,  is the annual income earned by U.S. domestic 
workers for sector s, and 𝛽  is the discount factor on Mexican immigrant wages in the 
U.S. labor market. Here, undocumented Mexican immigrants in the U.S. labor market 
earn annual incomes greater than those earned in the Mexican labor market, but smaller 
than those earned by domestic workers in the U.S. labor market.  This income 
discrimination is justified by Borjas (1996).  The cost-benefit migration decision follows: 
𝑌 , − 𝛼 𝑌 + 𝑃 + 𝐼 ≔ ≥ 0 ⟹ 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒;              < 0 ⟹ 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝛼 > 1 ∀ 𝑠, (2) 
where 𝛼 𝑌  is the cost-of-living-adjusted annual income in Mexico for sector s (𝛼  
accounts for the differences in living costs associated with moving from Mexico to the 
relatively-more-expensive U.S.; this places both incomes on the same scale, in terms of 
purchasing power in the U.S.7),  𝑃  is the price paid to smugglers for transportation 
across the U.S.-Mexico border in sector s (I assume that agricultural workers in Mexico 
will use perfectly-competitive smugglers, and non-agricultural workers in Mexico will 
use monopolistically-competitive smugglers), and 𝐼  is an indirect cost function that 
accounts for the remaining income gap at equilibrium in sector s.   
The indirect cost function is an important concept in this model, since unskilled 
wages in the two countries are not equal.  The ratio of U.S.-to-Mexico wages is 4.8 for 
agriculture and 3.6 for non-agriculture industries, meaning that a rational choice cost-
benefit calculation would lead the average unskilled Mexican national to migrate illegally 
                                                 





to the U.S.  However, there are other normative (or non-quantifiable) values that interfere 
with the rational choice cost-benefit calculations and ultimately outweigh the value of 
migrating to the U.S., as determined by survey work by Ryo (2013).  For undocumented 
Mexican nationals, these indirect costs include the disutility of being far away from home 
and family, the danger of crossing the border illegally under the guidance of smugglers, 
the expected probability of apprehension and consequent sanctions, and the emotional 
and physical toll of living and working in the U.S. as an unauthorized immigrant.  A 
fraction of these indirect costs come as a consequence of international travel, and are 
therefore experienced by all immigrants (legal or otherwise), but the majority of this 
indirect cost function is a consequence of being an illegal immigrant. 
This indirect cost function, following Hertel and Zhai (2006), can be expressed in the 
following constant elasticity functional form: 
𝐼 = 𝛾 𝐿 ,𝐿 ,  (3) 
where γ is a shift parameter, 𝜂  is the price elasticity of immigrant labor supply from 
Mexico to the U.S., 𝐿 ,  is the total number of undocumented Mexican immigrants 
working in sector s in the United States, and 𝐿  is the total number of Mexican 
nationals working in sector s in Mexico.  Figure 3.1 is a stylized, graphical depiction of 






Figure 3.1 Total Cost Curve for Undocumented Mexican Immigrants Seeking 
Employment in the (a) Agriculture and (b) Non-agriculture Sectors 
When 𝐿 / 𝐿  is equal to the share of Mexican agricultural workers currently 
living illegally in the U.S.—an estimated 2.93 percent—then equation (2) will equal zero 
for the agriculture sector.  Likewise, when 𝐿 / 𝐿  is equal to the share of 
Mexican non-agricultural workers currently living illegally in the U.S.—an estimated 
11.87 percent—then equation (2) will equal zero for the non-agriculture sector (see 
section 3.3 for an explanation of the data used in these estimates). 
Conceptually, the current stock of Mexican immigrants, as a percentage of total 
Mexican employment in their respective sectors (i.e. agriculture or non-agriculture), 
individually exhibit an indirect cost curve that, when added to the direct costs of 
migration, is of lower value than the potential U.S. income.  The marginal Mexican 
immigrant is the person whose direct and indirect costs of illegal immigration equal the 
potential U.S. income; these individuals are indifferent about immigrating to the U.S. 
(although in this model, they do migrate).  Any individuals who exhibit higher indirect 
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costs than the marginal immigrant will not migrate illegally to the U.S., even if a wage-
based, rational choice cost-benefit analysis would apparently make it a beneficial 
decision. 
The implementation of a market-based immigration policy will affect the shape of the 
indirect cost function in equation (3), effectively making it a flatter curve.  This change in 
the indirect cost function will reflect a reduction of the indirect costs associated with 
illegal immigration; in this way, the post-reform indirect cost curve will reflect the 
disutility of international travel that all legal immigrants face. 
 
3.1.2 Illegal Immigrant Smuggling Industry 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the immigrant smuggling industry is divided into two 
distinct market structures.  A small part of the smuggling market share is controlled by 
small-scale, low-skill smugglers that function under perfect competition; prices equal 
marginal cost.  The much larger part of the smuggling market share is controlled by 
large-scale, high-skill smugglers that operate under monopolistic competition; prices are 
determined by the smugglers and equal a constant markup over marginal cost. 
 
3.1.2.1 Perfectly Competitive Smugglers 
The literature states that the overwhelming majority of small-scale, perfectly-
competitive smugglers offer services exclusively to young males looking for agricultural 
employment.  Therefore, demand for perfectly competitive smugglers is dependent on the 





Using this information, I model the derived demand function for perfectly 
competitive smugglers using the short-run cost function for U.S. agricultural producers, 
similar to the methods used by Friedlaender and Spady (1980) in their approximation of 
the demand function for freight transportation services.   
First, I assume the following agricultural production function: 𝐹 = 𝑓 𝑇, 𝐾, 𝐿 , , 𝐿 , , (4) 
where the inputs used include land (T), capital (K), domestic labor (𝐿 , ), and 
immigrant labor (𝐿 , ), and total U.S. agricultural production is represented by F.   
I represent the short-run variable costs in agricultural production as: 𝐶 = 𝐶 𝐹, 𝑇, 𝐾, 𝑌 , , 𝑌 , . (5) 
Following Shephard’s lemma (1973), the partial derivative of the short-run variable costs 
in agricultural production, 𝐶 , with respect to the price of immigrant labor, 𝑌 , , 
yields the short-run demand function for immigrant labor in agriculture: 
𝐿 , = 𝜕𝐶 (𝐹, 𝑇, 𝐾, 𝑌 , , 𝑌 , )𝜕𝑌 , . (6) 
I assume that the price paid by agricultural firms for immigrant workers reflects the 
price of smuggler services used to enter the U.S. labor market.  I approximate this in 
general form: 𝑌 , = 𝜙 𝛼 𝑌 , 𝑞 ⃑ , (7) 
where 𝛼 𝑌  is the cost-of-living-adjusted annual income faced by Mexican nationals 





the perfectly-competitive smuggler fees.  This vector includes the destination city in the 
U.S. (𝑞 ), the length of travel (𝑞 ), the total number of immigrants being guided in the 
same trip (𝑞 ), and the intensity of border enforcement (𝑞 ).  The price paid by 
agricultural firms for immigrant workers can be more precisely written: 𝑌 , = 𝑌 + 𝜓(𝑞 , 𝑞 , 𝑞 , 𝑞 ), (8) 
where 𝜓(⋅) represents the price function for perfectly-competitive smugglers, equal to the 
perfectly-competitive smugglers’ marginal cost function.  I adapt Gathmann’s (2008) 
interpretation of the marginal cost of an illegal trip across the U.S.-Mexico border, which 
compares the smuggler’s alternative legal revenues to the possible sanctions following 
apprehension by U.S. border authorities.  The perfectly-competitive smuggler’s marginal 
cost per trip across the U.S.-Mexico border is defined: 𝜓 = 𝑡(𝑞 , 𝑞 )𝑊 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑞 , 𝑞 )𝐹, (9) 
where 𝑡(⋅) is the time necessary to smuggle immigrants across the border (an increasing 
function of the destination city and the jointly determined length of travel), 𝑊  is 
widely interpreted as the alternative wage rate for unskilled smugglers (see qualitative 
survey results in Izcara Palacios, 2012), 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(⋅) is the probability of apprehension (an 
increasing function of the size of the traveling group and relative border enforcement 
hours), and 𝐹 is the value of punishment if apprehended.   
 
3.1.2.2 Monopolistically-Competitive Smugglers 
Monopolistically-competitive industries take on characteristics of both monopolies 





set their own price for a differentiated service, as with a monopoly.  However, there are 
no barriers to entry other than the fixed costs of establishing a network.  A portion of 
immigrant smugglers, i.e., the highly-organized, high-cost smugglers, behave like firms 
operating under monopolistic competition.  Although all “firms” offer the same 
transportation product, there are factors that affect the consumer perspective of the 
product, thereby introducing differentiation.   
The U.S.-Mexico border has uneven terrain and uneven coverage of border patrol 
stations, making some areas more desirable for smuggling operations.  However, the 
smuggling industry is a territory-based market in which smugglers must make an initial 
investment, including bribes to local drug cartels and border patrol officials, payments for 
an extended network of border spies, and the costs of safehouses on both sides of the 
border, in order to control a particular region.  Therefore, each smuggler has a small 
regional monopoly, but must still compete with the prices offered in nearby regions.   
Regions are differentiated by the terrain and physical difficulty of crossing, the 
distance to a major US city, and the reputation of the smugglers among the community 
(this is where network effects are especially important).  I assume symmetry among the N 
smuggler firms (where N is a large, positive integer) such that their marginal costs of 
production are equal, households satisfy the love-of-variety condition (so the larger N, 
the higher household utility), the elasticity of substitution between smuggler varieties is a 
constant equal to 𝜎 > 1 since monopolistic commodities are gross substitutes (therefore, 
monopolistically-competitive smuggler demand is a Dixit-Stiglitz CES function), and the 
optimal price chosen by smuggler firms is the value of the marginal cost plus a constant 





I define the consumption index of monopolistically-competitive smugglers as: 
𝑋 = 𝑥  , (10) 
where 𝑥  is the consumption of smuggler variety 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁}.  The household utility 
function is 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑋), which is homogenous, strongly quasi-concave, and strictly 
increasing.  Defining the price for monopolistically-competitive smuggler i as 𝑝 =𝑃 , and defining the budget as 𝑚 = 𝑌 , − 𝛼 𝑌 + 𝑃 +𝐼 , the household utility maximization problem is: 
max 𝑢 𝑥  (11) 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜  𝑝 𝑥 ≤ 𝑚. (12) 
Since smuggler i is a monopolistically-competitive firm, it will choose price 𝑝  in order to 
maximize profit, 𝜋 , while facing total consumption, 𝑥 , and marginal cost, 𝜓, which is 
identical to the marginal cost faced by perfectly-competitive smugglers in equation (10).   
The firm problem for monopolistically-competitive smugglers is: max 𝜋 = 𝑥 (𝑝 − 𝜓).  (13) 
Solving this problem yields the profit-maximizing price for smuggler i: 𝑝 = 𝜎𝜎 − 1 𝜓. (14) 
Here, the markup is equal to > 1, which converges to 1 with higher elasticities of 
substitution, meaning that the less differentiated the monopolistically-competitive 





3.2 Model Assumptions 
Studies in immigration—especially undocumented immigration—are grossly limited 
in the availability of data (and the reliability of what is available).  The behaviors of 
undocumented immigrants, migrant smugglers, and U.S. producers who hire 
unauthorized workers are motivated by factors that cannot be measured, short of a wide-
reaching, fully representative survey.  Because this topic is worthwhile, even with a lack 
of complete data, researchers often make an assortment of assumptions with varying 
implications.  This section outlines the specific assumptions I make in an effort to closely 
approximate the economic effects of an immigration policy shift, given the limited data 
resources and guidance from the latest literature in Mexican immigration to the United 
States. 
1. Mexican nationals are assumed to make rational consumer decisions about 
immigrating illegally into the United States, adjusted for “normative” consumer 
values: if the economic benefit of crossing the border illegally to work in an 
unskilled industry exceeds the direct and indirect costs of doing so, then they will 
migrate. 
2. There are many benefits of living in the U.S., but for simplicity, I assume that the 
only benefit in the short run is economic, i.e., the potential wage increase 
associated with employment in the U.S. labor market. 
3. The direct costs are defined as the price paid to smugglers for transport into the 
U.S. and the opportunity cost of lost wages in Mexico, adjusted for cost-of-living 





4. The indirect costs are defined as the disutility of crossing the border illegally 
(which includes the physical risk of dying, being injured, or kidnapped for ransom 
along the trek and the financial risk of being apprehended by immigration 
authorities after paying a steep smuggler fee), living away from home, and living 
as an undocumented immigrant in the U.S. 
5. Although Mexican nationals have varying degrees of educational attainment and 
English language proficiency, I assume that all undocumented Mexican 
immigrants have a substantially lower degree of educational attainment than their 
U.S.-born counterparts, and will face a discount on potential U.S. wages as a 
result.  I reflect this discount by using the 25th percentile of wages in U.S. 
industries as the potential U.S. wage for undocumented Mexican immigrants. 
6. Immigrants who are agricultural workers in Mexico will find agricultural labor in 
the U.S., and workers from all other industries in Mexico will find labor in the 
service, construction, and manufacturing sectors in the U.S., which employ 33, 15, 
and 14 percent of all unauthorized immigrants, respectively (Taylor et al., 2012; 
Passel and Cohn, 2015a). 
7. All undocumented immigrants from Mexico use smugglers for guidance across 
the border.  While it is possible that some are better-acquainted with the border 
terrain and can make the trek without a smuggler, this is less feasible for average 
Mexican citizens as border security becomes tighter.   
8. Undocumented immigrants looking for work in the agriculture sector are assumed 





non-agricultural work will use the large-scale, monopolistically competitive 
smugglers. 
9. All migrants in this model are assumed to be adults that migrate without their 
families. 
10. The consumption bundle for Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. is assumed to 
be the same as the consumption bundle for Mexican nationals, minus expenditures 
for education, entertainment, and personal use, which are spent on remittances.  In 
other words, undocumented Mexican migrants will not experience “lifestyle 
inflation” as they move to the United States 
11. The data from the Mexican Ethnosurvey of Family, Migration, and Labor, 
administered by the Mexican Migration Project is assumed to be representative of 
both the migrant population and the Mexican population, according to Ryo (2013) 




3.3.1 Unskilled Wage Rates in U.S. and Mexico  
U.S. wages come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment 
Statistics dataset.  I used the Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting sector (NAICS 
sector code 11) to account for the potential U.S. wages faced by undocumented Mexican 
migrants in agricultural employment, and the average of the Construction, Manufacturing, 
Accommodation and Food Services, and Other Services sectors (NAICS sector codes 23, 





undocumented Mexican migrants in non-agricultural employment.  Undocumented 
workers often receive lower wages than their native counterparts as a consequence of 
legal status, lack of English language abilities, and lower education attainment (Passel 
and Cohn, 2015a).  In order to account for this characteristic of the U.S. labor market 
faced by undocumented Mexican immigrants, I use the 25th percentile of U.S. wages for 
my analysis.  The 25th percentile of average U.S. agricultural annual income in 2013 is 
USD $18,230, and the average of the 25th percentile of average construction, 
manufacturing, accommodation services, food services, and other services annual 
incomes in 2013 is USD $23,803. 
Mexican wages come from the Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social.  I use the 
average wage from the agriculture sector to determine the annual income opportunity cost 
for Mexican nationals considering entering the U.S. agriculture labor market as 
undocumented immigrants.  The average 2013 agricultural wage in Mexico is 
approximately MXN $48,736, or USD $3,820.  I use the weighted average of all other 
sectors’ average wages to determine the annual income opportunity cost for Mexican 
nationals considering entering the U.S. construction, manufacturing, accommodation 
services, and food services labor markets as undocumented immigrants.  The average 
2013 non-agricultural wage in Mexico is approximately MXN $84,292, or USD $6,607. 
 
3.3.2 Smuggler Prices 
In order to estimate the range of smuggler prices faced by Mexican nationals who 
attempt to enter the United States illegally, I use data from the Mexican Ethnosurvey of 





project established and overseen by Princeton University and Universidad de Guadalajara; 
it is the largest, most comprehensive dataset on Mexican migrants and their communities 
in Mexico and the U.S.  As part of the survey, migrants self-identify as documented or 
undocumented immigrants.  Of the 3592 self-reported undocumented migrations 
observed from 1990 to 2008, there were 2964 immigrants, or 82.5 percent, who used a 
smuggler to cross the border.8  Of these, 2190 (or 73 percent of all immigrants using 
smugglers) reported the cost for the guide service.9   
Before the major border militarization strategies began, i.e. between 1990 and 1992, 
72.8 percent of all undocumented immigrants in the MMP survey used a smuggler.  
During the initial phases of Operations “Hold-the-Line”, “Gatekeeper”, “Safeguard”, and 
“Rio Grande” along the U.S.-Mexico border, i.e. between 1993 and 2000, 84.1 percent of 
undocumented immigrants used a smuggler.  In the post-9/11 era, i.e. between 2001 and 
2008, 91.4 percent of undocumented Mexican immigrants reported using a smuggler.  
Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics from the MMP data on undocumented Mexican 
immigrants, including a year-by-year breakdown of the smuggler usage rates and average 
smuggler prices faced.  It is clear that smuggler demand is influenced by U.S. border 
enforcement intensity.   
Although there is no differentiation between smuggler types (i.e. between perfectly-
competitive and monopolistically-competitive smugglers) in the existing MMP migrant 
survey, I calculate the approximate division based on the self-reported prices from the 
                                                 
8 In addition, 459 (or 12.8 percent) reported not using a smuggler, and 169 (or 4.7 percent) did not know or 
did not report if they used a smuggler. 
9 Of the 3592 migrants that self-reported as undocumented between 1990 and 2008, 774 reported use of a 
smuggler but did not know the price paid.  This may be an effect of the relatively common practice of 
network-financed smuggling among those Mexican immigrants with large family or community networks 





survey. First, we make the assumption that the perfectly-competitive smugglers do not 
change their cost structure between 1990 and 2008.  This is mainly due to their 
operational strategy: guide a handful of young, able-bodied men through border terrain 
with the lowest concentration of border security, such as mountainous or desert-ridden 
routes through the Arizona/New Mexico region.  I assume that they do not experience 
fixed costs, and their product and target market has remained the same since 1990.  Their 
customers pay lower amounts of money, but have to walk for much longer distances, so a 
substantial price increase cannot be justified.  If faced with a significant fee increase, 
these perfectly-competitive smugglers would lose customers to the monopolistically-
competitive smugglers whose services offer a shorter walk with high-skill guidance.  In 
contrast, monopolistically-competitive smugglers have dramatically changed their 
structure to account for the increased difficulty in crossing the border since 1993.   
Because of these characteristics, and the fact that the price data from the MMP survey 
has large variation, I calculate a price ceiling for the perfectly-competitive smugglers and 
assume that any prices above this threshold are prices paid for high-skill services from 
monopolistically-competitive smugglers.  This price ceiling is calculated as the arithmetic 
mean plus one standard deviation of the smuggler price data from 1990.  The real mean 
price from 1990 is $826, and the standard deviation of the 1990 data is 633, so the real 
price threshold for 1990 is $1,459.  Due to the assumption that the perfectly-competitive 
smuggler cost structure remains unchanged between 1990 and 2008, any real smuggler 
price above $1,459 is assumed to represent payment to a monopolistically-competitive 
smuggler.  Table 1 lists the average prices below (for perfectly competitive smugglers) 





2008.  It also lists the market share owned by the monopolistically-competitive 
smuggling sector, which represents the majority of smuggler service purchases beginning 
in 1998.   
Table 3.1 Self-reported Smuggler Use and Costs among Undocumented Mexican 
Immigrants, 1990-2008  
Source: Mexican Ethnosurvey of Family, Migration, and Labor, Mexican Migration 
Project, author’s calculations. 
*Note: the data analysis reflects that 100 percent of smuggler-using undocumented 
migrants in 2006 and 2008 used monopolistically-competitive smugglers. This is likely 
due to a data limitation as the total observations drop off after 2003; therefore, the price 
of the perfectly-competitive smugglers was determined by taking the average of the years 
before and after. 
 
Although this method is quite simplified and limited by the assumption that perfectly-
competitive smugglers are relatively unresponsive to changes in border security and by 
 Self-reported undocumented crossings 
 Average self-reported smuggler 


























1990 398 72.1 74.9  826 632 2,071 13.5 
1991 287 73.5 73.5  879 623 2,427 14.2 
1992 265 73.2 70.1  1,002 639 2,405 20.6 
1993 267 79.8 72.8  1,116 710 2,324 25.2 
1994 259 78.4 68.5  1,059 733 2,027 25.2 
1995 267 78.7 77.6  1,330 774 2,128 41.1 
1996 233 88.0 72.7  1,450 953 2,465 32.9 
1997 229 86.5 78.3  1,371 945 2,215 33.5 
1998 244 87.3 72.8  1,666 1,071 2,156 54.8 
1999 203 84.7 72.1  1,815 949 2,228 67.7 
2000 243 90.9 74.7  2,040 1,057 2,276 80.6 
2001 143 91.6 73.3  1,993 1,028 2,263 78.1 
2002 134 91.0 79.5  2,059 959 2,310 81.4 
2003 110 90.0 74.7  2,172 1,106 2,339 86.5 
2004 84 97.6 84.1  2,270 1,060 2,475 85.5 
2005 89 93.3 72.3  2,345 1,238 2,468 90.0 
2006 62 88.7 76.4  2,551 1,071* 2,551 100.0 
2007 44 86.4 68.4  2,641 904 2,868 88.5 





the dwindling number of undocumented crossing observations after 2005, both the 
average prices and market shares appear to follow closely the anecdotal evidence in the 
literature.  Interviews with smugglers and recent undocumented immigrants in the 
literature illustrate the same story represented by this partition of the smuggling sector 
(Lopez Castro, 1998; Cornelius, 2001; Gathmann, 2008; Dolfin and Genicot, 2010; 
Roberts et al., 2010; Izcara Palacios, 2012; Garsd, 2016).  Figure 1 further illustrates the 
dramatic shift in smuggling service market share. 
 
Figure 3.2 Real Average Smuggling Price for Mexican Nationals: Perfectly-Competitive 
vs. Monopolistically-Competitive Smugglers from 1990-2008  
Note: (adjusted for inflation in terms of 2011 U.S. dollars) 
Source: Mexican Migration Project, author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 3.2 is the graphical representation of the MMP survey responses described in 
Table 3.1.  The two lines represent the smuggling prices faced by undocumented 



















































































the literature: the lower prices, which represent the fees charged by low-scale, perfectly-
competitive smugglers, remain fairly constant through the near-20-year span, whereas the 
higher prices, which represent the fees charged by high-scale, monopolistically-
competitive smugglers, steadily increase over time, with dramatic spikes over years with 
particularly high levels of border patrol spending.   
The shaded portion of the figure represents the relative share of the migrant 
smuggling market controlled by monopolistically-competitive smugglers, as defined by 
the author’s calculations.  The market share owned by these large-scale smugglers was 
fairly small in 1990, but following the implementation of the militarized border 
protection strategies in 1993, the market share began a steady rise.  Toward the 
finalization of the border infrastructure-building era in California and Texas (after 1997), 
the market share of monopolistically-competitive smugglers skyrocketed.  This 
staggering shift in market share despite the larger prices charged by monopolistically-
competitive smugglers illustrates the added difficulty level in crossing the U.S.-Mexico 
border illegally after the militarization border patrol strategy.   
In this model, we assume that only migrants looking for agricultural employment use 
the small-scale, perfectly-competitive smugglers.  Since Mexican undocumented 
agriculture workers only represent an estimated 3.6 percent of all Mexican undocumented 
immigrants currently present in the U.S. (Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015; Taylor et al., 2012), 
then the story told by Figure 3.2 seems especially accurate. 
The MMP migration survey asks immigrants about the duration of their stay in the 
U.S.  From this data, I establish a distinct timeline difference between Mexican 





employment.  Figure 3.3 displays the histograms of duration length for Mexican 
immigrants seeking agricultural and non-agricultural employment, respectively, on their 
first entry into the U.S.   
 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of Length of Stay in the U.S. for First-time, Undocumented 
Mexican Immigrants Seeking (a) Agriculture and (b) Non-agriculture Employment, 
1990-2008 
Source: Mexican Migration Project. 
 
The majority of undocumented immigrants working in agriculture are seasonal 
migrants that remain in the country for a year or less (the median duration is 12 months 
for agriculture workers), whereas those working in non-agriculture sectors tend to stay 
for longer periods of time (the median duration is 24 months for non-agriculture workers).  
On average, undocumented immigrants seeking agricultural employment between 1990 
and 2008 stayed in the U.S. for nearly 24 months, or 2 years, while those seeking non-
agricultural employment stayed for nearly 34 months, or 2.8 years.  This has implications 
for the relative appeal of different smuggler costs: a higher-cost smuggling service may 




































3.3.3 Cost-of-Living Adjustment 
The cost-of-living adjustment was calculated by adjusting the average Mexican 
consumption bundle for necessities to the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar.  I used the 
study of 2013 Mexican household purchases from Pereyra (2015).  The study estimates 
the average Mexican household’s spending distribution as a percentage of total household 
income, separated into the following variables: housing and utilities, food, clothing, 
transportation, health, household appliances, education, entertainment, and personal use.  
This distribution of Mexican household spending is displayed in Figure 3.4.   
 
Figure 3.4 Average Mexican Expenses as Proportion of Household Income, 2013 
Source: Pereyra (2015). 
 
Note that approximately 68 percent of the average Mexican household’s income is 
used for basic necessities including housing, utilities, food, clothing, transportation, 

























their lifestyle, and will limit their spending to basic necessities while in the U.S.; the 
remaining 32 percent of their U.S. income is assumed to comprise the amount available 
for remittances.  These consumption distributions remain constant for all households in 
Mexico; agricultural and non-agricultural households spend their incomes in these same 
proportions. 
For Mexican agricultural households, the 2013 average annual income is 
approximately MXN $48,736 (or USD $3,820).  We assume these households will spend 
68.28 percent on basic necessities, or approximately MXN $33,277 (or USD $2,608) per 
year.  Given the USD-MXN Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of 193 (OECD, 2016), this 
bundle of goods is worth approximately MXN $64,224, or USD $5,034 if purchased in 
the United States.  The cost-of-living adjustment is the difference between the cost of 
living in the U.S. and Mexico, or approximately an additional USD $2,426 for 
agricultural Mexican immigrants. 
For Mexican non-agricultural households, the 2013 average annual income is 
approximately MXN $84,292 (or USD $6,607).  In Mexico, the average non-agricultural 
household spends approximately MXN $57,555 (or USD $4,511) on basic necessities, 
which has a value of approximately MXN $111,080, or USD $8,707 in the U.S.  The 
cost-of-living adjustment is approximately an additional $4,195 for non-agricultural 
Mexican immigrants. 
 
3.3.4 Labor Shares in Agricultural and Non-agricultural Sectors 
Data on the agricultural and non-agricultural labor markets in Mexico come from the 





In Quarter IV of 2013, approximately 52.3 million individuals were part of the 
economically-active Mexican population.  Approximately 6.9 million, or 13.17 percent, 
were employed in the agriculture sector, and 45.5 million were employed in all other 
sectors in Mexico. 
In the U.S., estimates of the total number of undocumented immigrants come from 
the Pew Hispanic Research Center.  Passel and Cohn (2015b) estimate that in 2014, 
approximately 11.3 million undocumented individuals lived in the United States.  
Gonzalez-Barrera (2015) estimates that 49.6 percent, or 5.6 million are Mexican-born, 
and approximately 3.59 million of these are currently economically-active (i.e. 
employed).  In 2013, total U.S. agricultural employment was 435,250 workers, according 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  At the mean U.S. annual wage for agriculture 
employment, the total value of U.S. agricultural labor is approximately $10.59 billion.  
Hertel et al. (2012) estimate the production cost share of agricultural labor is 0.38, and 
the National Agricultural Worker Survey estimates that 68 percent of this total is 
Mexican-born, and 68 percent of the Mexican-born agricultural labor force is 
undocumented (Taylor et al., 2012).  Therefore, we can estimate that approximately 
201,260 undocumented Mexican immigrants currently work in the U.S. agriculture sector.  
Thus, the remaining 3.36 million economically-active, undocumented Mexican 





CHAPTER 4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MARKET-BASED IMMIGRATION 
POLICY ON U.S. AGRICULTURE USING A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL  
4.1 The Empirical Partial Equilibrium Model: SIMPLE-MIG 
I implement the conceptual model of the undocumented Mexican migrant labor 
market in US agriculture in partial equilibrium to closely examine the wage and 
employment impacts of an immigration policy shift.  This model, which draws some 
elements from the Simplified International Model of agricultural Prices, Land use and the 
Environment, or SIMPLE (Baldos and Hertel, 2012), simulates the effects of an 
endogenous migration movement on the U.S. agriculture sector.  As part of the partial 
equilibrium assumptions, I fix total agricultural production to quantify the shift in 
undocumented, agriculture labor supply given an immigration policy change, ceteris 
paribus.   
In the spirit of SIMPLE, I modified the agriculture production function to use two 
inputs, namely undocumented Mexican migrant labor (𝑄 ) and other inputs 
(𝑄 ), in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) framework.  The elasticity of 
substitution (𝜎 ) allows for the substitution of these two inputs in total agricultural 
production (𝑄 ).  The supply of undocumented Mexican labor is determined 
endogenously by an equation that links the wages for agricultural labor in the U.S. and 
Mexico.  Mexican agricultural labor is discounted with a tax (𝜏 ), which represents 





With agricultural output fixed, there is no need for consumer demand equations.  The 
model can be represented in six equations, which determine the agricultural production 
system in log-linearized (i.e., percentage change) terms, which are denoted with a tilde 
above the term.  The model consists of the following system of equations: 
Long run supply for undocumented Mexican migrant labor inputs in U.S. agriculture: 𝑄 = 𝜂 ∗ 𝑃 , (15) 
where 𝜂  is the wage elasticity of labor supply for Mexican nationals in U.S. 
agriculture, and 𝑃  is the wage faced by Mexican nationals in Mexican agriculture. 
Long run supply for other inputs in U.S. agriculture: 𝑄 = 𝜂 ∗ 𝑃 , (16) 
where 𝜂  is the price elasticity of supply of other inputs in agriculture and 𝑃  is 
the average price paid for other inputs. 
Long run derived demand for undocumented Mexican migrant labor inputs in U.S. 
agriculture: 𝑄 = 𝑄 − 𝜎 𝑃 − 𝑃 . (17) 
Long run derived demand for other inputs in U.S. agriculture: 𝑄 = 𝑄 − 𝜎 𝑃 − 𝑃 . (18) 
Unit cost condition for U.S. agriculture producers: 𝑃 = 𝜃 𝑃  + 𝜃 𝑃 , (19) 
where 𝜃  is the cost share of undocumented Mexican migrant labor in U.S. 







U.S.-Mexico agricultural labor price linkage (a levels equation):  𝜏 = 𝑃 − 𝛼 ∗ 𝑃 , (20) 
where 𝜏  is the additive tax that represents the income gap between agricultural 
employment in the two countries, 𝑃  is the price of Mexican immigrant labor in 
U.S. agriculture, 𝛼  is a coefficient that accounts for the cost-of-living adjustment, and 𝑃  is the price of labor in Mexican agriculture. 
 
4.2 Determining the Wage Elasticity of Mexican Immigrant Labor Supply 
One of the most important variables in this model is the elasticity of Mexican 
immigrant labor supply with respect to agricultural wages, depicted in the model 
as 𝜂 .  There has been scarce research on the determination of this specific 
elasticity,10 so we approximate the value under the guidance of the relevant literature.  
Buccola and colleagues (2011) approximate the labor supply elasticity for the nursery 
industry in Oregon to be equal to 5.15.  Although their sample is random, and hence 
representative of the agriculture labor force generally, their study does not differentiate 
between domestic and immigrant labor, nor does it analyze the labor market behaviors of 
Mexican immigrants specifically.  We attempt to further refine this elasticity using a 
mathematical analysis of the excess labor supply from Mexico. 
In equilibrium, immigrant labor demand in the U.S. is equal to the excess labor 
supply in Mexico, i.e., the difference between the labor supply in Mexico and the labor 
demand in Mexico.  This is represented in the following equation: 
                                                 
10 The majority of work on the labor market effects of low-skill immigrants has focused on the effects of a 




 𝐿𝐷𝑈𝑆 = 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑋 − 𝐿𝐷𝑀𝑋. (21) 
We log-linearize this equation to determine the excess labor supply in percent-change 
terms, which are denoted by a tilde above the term: 
𝐿𝐷𝑈𝑆 = 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑋𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑋 − 𝐿𝐷𝑀𝑋 𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑋 − 𝐿𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑋 − 𝐿𝐷𝑀𝑋 𝐿𝐷𝑀𝑋. (22) 
Let 𝛼 = − .  Since − = 1, we say = 1 − 𝛼.   
We can rewrite equation (22) as: 𝐿𝐷𝑈𝑆 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑆𝑀𝑋 − (𝛼)𝐿𝐷𝑀𝑋. (23) 
Define 𝐿 ≔ 𝜂 𝑊 , and 𝐿 ≔ 𝜂 𝑊 , where 𝜂𝑆𝑀𝑋 and 𝜂𝐷𝑀𝑋 are the wage 
elasticities of labor supply and labor demand, respectively, and 𝑊𝐴𝑔𝑀𝑋 is the agricultural 
wage in Mexico, in percent-change terms.  This implies: 𝐿𝐷𝑈𝑆 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜂𝑆𝑀𝑋𝑊𝐴𝑔𝑀𝑋 − (𝛼)𝜂𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑊𝐴𝑔𝑀𝑋. (24) 
Rearranging the terms, we have: 𝐿𝐷𝑈𝑆 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜂𝑆𝑀𝑋 − (𝛼)𝜂𝐷𝑀𝑋 ∗ 𝑊𝐴𝑔𝑀𝑋. (25) 
Therefore, we conclude that the excess labor supply elasticity with respect to Mexican 
wages is: 𝜂𝑋𝑆𝑀𝑋 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜂𝑆𝑀𝑋 − (𝛼)𝜂𝐷𝑀𝑋. (26) 
From the literature, 𝜂𝑆𝑀𝑋 = 1.25 (Hanson, 2007) and 𝜂𝐷𝑀𝑋 = −0.3 (Fajnzylber and 
Maloney, 2005).  Since we know that 𝛼 < −1, we know 𝜂 = 1.25 − 1.55𝛼 > 2.8.  
Using Buccola and colleagues’ (2011) estimates as an upper bound, we can bound the net 





(2.8, 5.15).  In the analysis below, the base case results use the mid-point of this range, i.e. 𝜂  = 3.975. 
 
4.3 Calibrating the Model 
In this model, the key driver of endogenous labor migration from Mexican agriculture 
to U.S. agriculture is the exogenous, additive tax placed on the value of Mexican 
agriculture wages.  We assume undocumented Mexican immigrants earn the 25th 
percentile of 2013 U.S. agriculture wages (USD $18,230 annually) and Mexican 
nationals earn the average of 2013 Mexican agriculture wages (USD $3,820 annually).  
We adjusting these wages into an index with U.S. wages equal to 1 and Mexican wages 
equal to 0.209.  Calculating the cost-of-living coefficient as 1.635, the cost-of-living-
adjusted Mexican agriculture wages are equal to 0.342 (as a price index), and the pre-
reform additive tax on Mexican agricultural wages is 0.658.  With an open-border 
immigration policy, this tax rate would converge toward zero in equilibrium.  The current 
quota-based immigration policy severely restricts natural labor movement between the 
two countries; thus, a shift to a market-based immigration policy can be simulated in this 
partial equilibrium model by reducing the additive tax on Mexican agricultural wages.   
The model reflects the current employment of undocumented Mexican migrants in 
agriculture, totaling 201,260 worker-years at pre-reform equilibrium.  We assume that the 
wage elasticity of Mexican immigrant labor supply to U.S. agriculture is the midpoint of 
the range described above, so that 𝜂  = 3.975.  This indicates that a one-percent 
increase in U.S. agriculture wages results in a 3.975 percent increase in labor supply from 






Since the undocumented Mexican labor supply is extremely elastic, even a relatively 
large number of new undocumented Mexican laborers immigrating to the U.S. would not 
affect agriculture wages in Mexico dramatically.  However, since the hired labor demand 
curve in U.S. agriculture is more inelastic, a large influx of Mexican immigrant laborers 
will sharply decrease the wage faced by immigrants in U.S. agriculture.  Eliminating 
completely the tax on Mexican agriculture wages leads to a substantial increase in total 
labor supply in the U.S. agriculture sector, from 201.26 thousand undocumented Mexican 
immigrant workers to 369.92 thousand.   
This movement along the supply schedule represents a “full reform” scenario, where 
the complete elimination of the specific tax on Mexican agriculture wages simulates an 
open border policy between Mexico and the United States.  The post-reform agricultural 
wages for Mexican workers in both countries are equal at 0.399 (as a price index, where 
pre-reform wages paid in the U.S. equal 1.0).  Given the PE supply and demand 
schedules depicted in Figure 4.1, the price of labor for undocumented Mexican migrants 
in U.S. agriculture falls precipitously by 60.2 percent, while the price of labor for 
Mexican nationals in Mexican agriculture rises incrementally by 16.6 percent.   
Figure 4.1 graphically represents the tax burden shared by U.S. agriculture producers 
(the diagonal-stripe-shaded area) and the tax burden shared by the Mexican immigrant 
labor force (the solid-grey-shaded area).  U.S. agriculture producers absorb a much larger 
share of the tax burden because their derived demand for Mexican labor is relatively 
more inelastic than the supply.  A reduction of the additive tax on Mexican agriculture 
wages benefits the most inelastic side of the market.  Here, the most benefit from a free-





massive reduction in labor costs and increase their total use of undocumented Mexican 
immigrant labor by 83.8 percent under a fixed agricultural production assumption. 
We can calculate the tax incidence for Mexican immigrant workers using the 
following equation: Tax Incidence for Immigrant Labor = (Percent Change of Price of 
Agriculture Labor in Mexico)/(Percent Change of Price of Agriculture Labor in Mexico – 
Percent Change in Price of Mexican Immigrant Labor in U.S. Agriculture).  When the 
additive tax on Mexican agricultural wages is reduced to zero, the tax incidence for 
immigrant labor is 0.2158, meaning that 21.6 percent of the effect of a tax shift (here, this 
is a benefit, since the tax is reduced) accrues to the immigrant labor force, whereas 78.4 
percent of the effect accrues to agricultural producers in the United States. 
Removing restrictions on the movement of international low-skill labor also has 
aggregate efficiency implications: the vertical-line-shaded area in Figure 4.1 represents 
the deadweight loss of the pre-reform additive tax on Mexican agricultural wages.  This 
deadweight loss is reflective of the labor force allocative inefficiency created by the tax 
on Mexican agricultural wages.  We can simulate the labor market effects in the 
agriculture sector of a market-based immigration policy by reducing the additive tax on 
Mexican agricultural wages to a value between 0.658 (its pre-reform value) and zero 
(simulating an open border).  Since the value of the tax reduction depends on the chosen 
cost of the visa, it is a useful exercise to experiment with varying cost schemes. 
 
4.4 Experiments 
A key part of establishing a market-based immigration policy lies in determining the 





the additive tax on Mexican agriculture wages is reduced in amounts that reflect different 
pricing schemes.  In these experiments, we attempt to quantify the extent to which a shift 
in immigration policy can reduce the indirect costs of migration for Mexican nationals.  
Legal migrants and illegal migrants must both pay for the direct costs of migration, i.e., 
the transportation cost (including visa fees for legal migrants and smuggler fees for 
illegal migrants) and the cost-of-living-adjusted opportunity cost of lost Mexican wages.  
Therefore, the share of the additive tax on Mexican wages that can be eliminated with an 
immigration policy shift is equal to the share comprised of the indirect costs of migration.  
Because the determinants of this indirect cost curve are near-impossible to quantify and 
not entirely exclusive to those migrating illegally11, we must make broad assumptions 
about the share of the indirect cost curve directly attributable to the illegal characteristics 
of undocumented migration and smuggler use.   
Table 4.1 below details the calculations for the changes in additive tax on Mexican 








                                                 
11 For example, the disutility of being away from family and country is experienced by all international 
migrants to some degree, so we cannot claim that all indirect costs faced by undocumented migrants can be 





Table 4.1 Policy Shock Calculations for Additive Tax on Mexican Agriculture Wages 
 Value (Price Index in Parentheses) 
U.S. agriculture annual income; 25th percentile (a) $18,230 (1.0) 
Cost-of-living-adjusted Mexico agriculture annual income (b) $6,246 (0.342) 
Pre-reform additive tax on Mexican agriculture wages (c = a-b) $11,984 (0.658) 
 
Visas priced at 
average P.C. 
smuggler cost 
Visas priced at 
upper bound of 
smuggler cost 
Transportation Cost (d) $1,082 (0.059) $5,000 (0.274) 
Direct costs of migration (e = b+d) $7,328 (0.402) $11,246 (0.617) 
Indirect costs of migration (f = a-e) $10,902 (0.598) $6,984 (0.383) 
   
Policy-adjusted additive tax on Mexican agriculture wages (Price Index): 
All indirect costs reduced with policy reform (c-f) Exp. 1: 0.059  Exp. 2: 0.274  
Half of indirect costs reduced with policy reform (c-0.5f) Exp. 3: 0.359 Exp. 4: 0.466 
Note: all prices are in 2013 USD. 
In the first experiment, visas are priced at USD $1,082, the average smuggling cost 
faced by those working in the agriculture sector (i.e., the average smuggling cost charged 
by small scale, perfectly competitive smugglers).  In this case, we assume that the entire 
indirect cost curve can be reduced with an immigration policy.  Thus, we reduce the 
additive tax on Mexican agricultural wages by 90.97 percent (from additive rate 0.658 to 
0.059).   
In the second experiment, visas are priced at USD $5,000, the upper bound of 
smuggling prices recorded in the MMP survey.  We assume that all indirect costs are 
attributable to illegal migration, so the policy reform removes them completely.  Here, we 
reduce the additive tax by 58.3 percent (from 0.658 to 0.274).   
The third experiment is the same as the first except for the share of indirect costs that 
can be reduced with a policy shift.  Here, only half of the indirect costs are assumed to be 
attributed to illegal migration; thus, we reduce the additive tax on Mexican agricultural 





The fourth experiment is the same as the second (the price of visas is also USD 
$5,000) but we assume that half of the indirect costs are attributable to illegal migration.  
With only half of the indirect costs reduced, the tax on Mexican agricultural wages is 
reduced by 29.13 percent (from 0.658 to 0.466).   
It is appropriate that a visa pricing scheme pegged to the average smuggler costs 
faced by Mexican migrants seeking agricultural employment (at $1,082, a substantially 
lower price than the alternate $5,000 scheme) will have consistently lower policy-
adjusted additive tax levels.  A lower visa price will appeal to more Mexicans, and should 
logically have the lower post-reform tax level.   
 
4.5 Partial Equilibrium Results and Discussion 
As with the complete reduction of the additive tax on Mexican agriculture wages 
depicted in Figure 4.2 above, every experiment resulted in similar changes for the U.S. 
agriculture labor market.   
Table 4.2 lists the changes in undocumented Mexican migrant wages in U.S. 
agriculture, wages for Mexican nationals in Mexican agriculture, quantity of 
undocumented Mexican migrants used in the U.S. agriculture labor force, and the 
agricultural price of production in the U.S., in both percent change terms (relative to the 









Table 4.2 Partial Equilibrium Effects of Reducing Additive Tax on Mexican Ag. Wages 
  





Visa Priced at 
$1,082 
Experiment 2: 
Visa Priced at 
$5,000 
Experiment 3: 
Visa Priced at 
$1,082 
Experiment 4: 
Visa Priced at 
$5,000 
Variables Level % Δ Level % Δ Level % Δ Level % Δ Level 
τLABMEX 0.658 -90.97 0.059 -58.31 0.274 -45.47 0.359 -29.13 0.466 
PMXLABOR 1.00 -55.04 0.45 -35.80 0.64 -28.04 0.72 -18.06 0.82 
αCOL*PLABMEX 0.342 14.20 0.391 7.59 0.368 5.57 0.361 3.33 0.353 
QMXLABOR 201.3 69.50 341.1 33.77 269.2 24.06 249.7 13.90 229.2 
PAG 9.79 -12.29 8.59 -7.22 9.08 -5.47 9.26 -3.38 9.46 
Units: τLABMEX in additive tax rates, PMXLABOR and PLABMEX in price index terms with U.S. pre-
reform labor price = 1, QMXLABOR in thousands of worker-years, and PAG in USD per metric ton. 
For a graphical exposition of the effects of each respective shock on the additive tax 
on Mexican agricultural wages, refer to Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, which depict 
Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  As expected, Experiment 1 increases labor 
migration flows to the U.S. agriculture sector by the most, totaling an influx of 139.8 
thousand workers: an additional 139.9 thousand workers (69.5 percent) over the pre-
reform equilibrium.  At a visa price of $1,082, this population movement adds an 
immediate $151.3 million to the U.S. economy, which has welfare implications that fall 
outside the scope of this partial equilibrium model, but are noteworthy. 
This labor population shift causes substantial downward pressure on agricultural labor 
wage rates faced by Mexican migrants in the U.S (a reduction of 55 percent).  Meanwhile, 
agricultural labor wage rates faced by Mexican nationals in Mexico only rise by 14.2 
percent.  Again, this illustrates that an influx of low-skill labor migration strongly favors 
the most inelastic side of the market—here, agricultural producers in the U.S.  This 
benefit to U.S. agricultural producers can be seen through the decrease in the average cost 








attributable to illegal immigration (as opposed to disutility from international travel, 
broadly speaking).  Therefore, if a market-based immigration policy were implemented 
for Mexican nationals, with a visa pricing scheme pegged to the average cost of 
perfectly-competitive smuggling services, it is likely that the labor market effects of a 
policy change should lie between the results of Experiment 3 (as a lower bound) and 
Experiment 1 (as an upper bound). 
 The total quantity of Mexican immigrant labor used in the U.S. agriculture sector is 
249.7 thousand workers, an increase of 48.4 thousand workers (24.1 percent) over the 
pre-reform equilibrium.  At a visa price of $1,082 per person, this policy shift adds an 
immediate $52.4 million to the U.S. economy.  Labor wage rates for Mexican immigrants 
working in U.S. agriculture decrease by 28 percent, while labor wage rates in Mexican 
agriculture increase by 5.6 percent. 
The tax incidence for immigrant labor for Experiment 3 is 0.166, indicating that 16.6 
percent of the benefits of this tax reduction accrue to Mexican immigrant workers, and 






One important thing to note from this series of experiments is that they attempt to 
capture a range of the agriculture labor market effects of implementing a market-based 
immigration policy for Mexican nationals.  More specifically, the range of visa pricing 
schemes and the range of indirect cost reductions establishes a lower bound for the 
quantity of new migrants in Experiment 4, and an upper bound in Experiment 1.  
I next approximate the welfare impacts of a market-based immigration policy, 
focusing on the groups affected by the partial equilibrium results.  Using “back of the 
envelope” calculations, I use the partial equilibrium results to generate differences in 
incomes across the various groups involved in this policy shift: new immigrants coming 
into the U.S. agriculture labor market from Mexico, undocumented Mexican immigrants 
working in the U.S. agriculture industry prior to the policy shift, U.S. farm firms, 
perfectly-competitive smugglers, and the U.S. Government.  Table 4.3 lists the estimated 
income changes for the average individual in U.S. dollars and the total income change for 
all workers in each group in millions of U.S. dollars.   
For individual new migrants, the income change is calculated using the following 
formula: (Average Agriculture Annual Income Faced by Undocumented Workers in the 
U.S. * [1 + (Percent Change in the Price of Undocumented Ag Labor in the U.S. / 100)]) 
– (Average Agriculture Annual Income Faced by Workers in Mexico * [1 + (Percent 
Change in Price of Ag Labor in Mexico / 100)]).  To calculate the total income change 
for new migrants as a group, the individual change in income is multiplied by the total 
number of new migrants. 
For individual undocumented migrants working in the U.S. prior to the policy shift, 





Annual Income Faced by Undocumented Workers in the U.S. * [1 + (Percent Change in 
the Price of Undocumented Ag Labor in the U.S. / 100)] – Average Agriculture Annual 
Income Faced by Undocumented Workers in the U.S.  To calculate the total income 
change for undocumented migrants working in the U.S. prior to the policy shift, the 
individual change in income is multiplied by the total number of migrants pre-reform, i.e. 
201.26 thousand. 
U.S. farms benefit from a reduction in the cost of labor and an increased tendency to 
substitute labor inputs in place of more-costly non-labor inputs.  The U.S. agriculture 
producers’ change in revenue is calculated using the following formula: (Post-reform 
Quantity of Undocumented Workers in U.S. Agriculture * [Average Agriculture Annual 
Income Faced by Undocumented Workers in the U.S. * [1+ Percent Change in the Price 
of Undocumented Ag Labor in the U.S. / 100)] – (Pre-reform Quantity of Undocumented 
Workers in U.S. Agriculture * Average Agriculture Annual Income Faced by 
Undocumented Workers in the U.S.)) + (Post-reform Quantity of “Other” Inputs Used in 
Ag Production * Average Price of “Other” Inputs) – (Pre-reform Quantity of “Other” 
Inputs Used in Ag Production * Average Price of “Other” Inputs). 
For smugglers, the income change is calculated using the following formula: (Price of 
Perfectly-Competitive Smuggler Services * Total Number of New Migrants), where the 
price of smuggler services is $1,082 per person.  For the U.S. Government, the income 
change is calculated using the following formula: (Visa Price for Mexican Nationals * 
Total Number of New Migrants), where the visa price is $1,082 in experiments 1 and 3 





Table 4.3 “Back of the Envelope” Income Changes Given the Partial Equilibrium 
Changes in U.S. Agriculture Employment of Mexican Immigrants 
Group Affected 
Revenue Changes  
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 
New Migrants as Individuals (U.S. Dollars) 4,268.90 7,822.54 9,259.76 11,083.63 
New Migrants as a Group (Millions of U.S. 
Dollars) 
597.10 531.61 448.39 310.15 
Migrants in the U.S. prior to the Policy Shift as 
Individuals (Dollars) 
-10,026.5 -6,526.34 -5,104.4 -3,299.63 
Migrants in the U.S. Prior to the Policy Shift as a 
Group (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
-2,017.93 -1,313.49 -1,027.31 -664.08 
U.S. Agriculture Producers (Millions of U.S. 
Dollars) 
3,427.78 1,838.79 1,389.40 862.19 
Smugglers (Millions of U.S. Dollars) -151.34 -73.53 -52.39 -30.28 
U.S. Government (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 151.34 339.80 52.39 139.91 
 
For Mexican immigrants newly entering the U.S. agriculture labor market from 
Mexico, the policy shift has positive effects on their total revenues.  The individual wage 
increase in experiment 4 is much larger than in experiment 1 because the average 
agricultural income faced by undocumented workers in the U.S. decreases by a smaller 
magnitude in experiment 4.  Across the four experiments, new migrants face substantial 
income gains: more than doubling the pre-reform Mexican agriculture wage of USD 
$3,820 even in the scenario with the smallest income change.  These increased incomes, 
when sent to households in Mexico, increase in purchasing power by nearly double 
(recall that USD-MXN PPP = 193).  Taylor and Martin (2001) claim that remittances sent 
to rural Mexico have multiplicative effects when they are invested in crucial 
infrastructure, nutrition, healthcare, and education; therefore, the welfare effects for 
Mexican households are much larger than the purchasing-power-adjusted real value of 
remittances.  This policy shift is overwhelmingly positive for Mexican immigrants newly 
entering the U.S. agriculture labor market and their households.  However, migrants 





movement in their annual income.  The total decline in income for pre-reform immigrants 
largely exceeds the revenue growth for both new migrants and their households in 
Mexico, so it is difficult to definitively claim that this policy shift affects all Mexican 
immigrants equally. 
On the other hand, the benefits accruing to U.S. agriculture producers are clearly 
larger than benefits accruing to any other affected group.  This is due to two factors: a 
substantial decline in labor wage rates and increased substitution away from the more 
expensive non-immigrant-labor inputs.  Even though U.S. agriculture producers are 
employing larger numbers of Mexican immigrants across all experiments, the wage rates 
drop sufficiently so that farm firms are spending less on labor in total, compared to pre-
reform expenditures.  U.S. agriculture producers are the big winners in this policy shift, 
gaining between an estimated $862 million and $3.4 billion, depending on the scenario. 
Since this policy creates a channel of labor migration for low-skilled Mexican 
nationals, smuggler demand declines, and any rents going to smugglers before the policy 
shift are now directed at the U.S. Government.  Assuming the average price of perfectly-
competitive smugglers in the MMP data (i.e. $1,082 per trip), we estimate that smugglers 
at the U.S.-Mexico border lose between $30.28 million and $151.34 million.  These rents 
are shifted toward the U.S. government.  Assuming a visa pricing scheme of $1,082 per 
visa in experiments 1 and 3, and $5,000 per visa in experiments 2 and 4, we estimate that 
the U.S. government gains between $52.4 million and $339.8 million as a result of 
implementing a market-based immigration policy for Mexican nationals seeking 






CHAPTER 5. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A MARKET-BASED IMMIGRATION 
POLICY USING A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL  
5.1 Introduction to the GMig2-U Model 
The CGE model that I use as a foundation for this project is the global migration 
model with undocumented workers in the United States, known as GMig2-U, created by 
Aguiar (2009) and previously used in an analysis of immigration policy reform by Aguiar 
and Walmsley (2013).  This model is augments the global migration model and database, 
GMig2, created by Walmsley, Winters and Ahmed (2007). This is based on the standard 
GTAP model, a comparative-static CGE model of international trade created by Hertel 
(1997).  Figure 5.1 depicts the CES nested production structure within GMig2-U. 
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In GMig2-U, total quantity of output (QO) is determined by the amount of 
intermediate inputs (QF) and value-added inputs (QVA) used in production.  Each 
decision tree is defined by a constant elasticity of substitution, denoted by a variant of σ.  
Intermediate inputs can be domestic (QFD) or imported (QFM).  Value-added, or 
composite, inputs include natural resources, capital, land, and labor divided into two skill 
types: skilled and unskilled.  Demand for unskilled labor (QFE) is divided into two types: 
domestic and foreign (QFUE).  Foreign labor is divided into two types: documented and 
undocumented.  The addition of undocumented, unskilled labor shares in the United 
States, along with undocumented workers’ substitutability with domestic workers are the 
most notable changes from the GMig2 to the GMig2-U models. 
In this analysis, I will focus on the flows of unskilled, foreign, undocumented workers 
moving from Mexico to the United States.  I augment the GMig2-U model with a set of 
equations intended to replicate the role of immigrant smugglers along the U.S.-Mexico 
border.  Section 5.2 outlines these equations and their interactions with GMig2-U. 
 
5.2 Empirical Model Modifications 
Since immigrant smuggler firms provide services in Mexico’s informal economy, 
their market impact is not accounted for in the GMig2-U database.  Therefore, we create 
a new variable, VTUNDOC (value of transport for undocumented immigrants), to 
account for this market presence.   
Value of border transport services for undocumented Mexican immigrants entering 





𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 = 𝑉𝐹𝐴𝑈("𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑎𝑏", "𝑓𝑜𝑟", "𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔", 𝑗, "𝑈𝑆𝐴")𝑗∈𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀− 𝑉𝐹𝑀𝑈("𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑎𝑏", "𝑓𝑜𝑟", "𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔", 𝑗, "𝑈𝑆𝐴")𝑗∈𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀 .  
(27) 
Here, VTUNDOC is equivalent to the difference between the total value of unskilled, 
foreign, illegal labor in sector j (VFAU), and the total value of wages paid to unskilled, 
foreign, illegal labor in sector j (VFMU).  The rationale behind this equation lies in the 
assumption for equation (9) in the conceptual model, namely that the price paid by firms 
for undocumented immigrant workers reflects the price of smuggler services. 
For notation simplification, I define the total value of unskilled, foreign, 
undocumented immigrant labor in sector j as: 𝑉𝐹𝐴𝑈 = 𝑉𝐹𝐴𝑈("𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑎𝑏", "𝑓𝑜𝑟", "𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔", 𝑗, "𝑈𝑆𝐴"). (28) 
Similarly, I define the total wages paid for unskilled, foreign, undocumented immigrant 
labor in sector j as: 𝑉𝐹𝑀𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑋 = 𝑉𝐹𝑀𝑈("𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑎𝑏", "𝑓𝑜𝑟", "𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔", 𝑗, "𝑈𝑆𝐴"). (29) 
Expressing the value of wages paid to undocumented immigrants in sector j as a share 
of all U.S. sectors, we can define the share of the value of smuggler services in sector j as 
the following expression: 
𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐻𝑅 =  𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝐹𝑀𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑋∑ 𝑉𝐹𝑀𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑋∈ . (30) 
Since the immigrant smuggling sector is a service sector that operates outside of the 
realm of legal Mexican service commodities, the total value of service commodities in 
the Mexican economy is represented by adding the value of smuggler services 





Since we are effectively augmenting the size of the Mexican economy, we adjust the 
shares of domestic sales in Mexico (SHRDM), shares of global transport sector sales 
(SHRST), and shares of export sales of service commodities (SHRXMD), respectively, in 
the following three equations: 
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝐷𝑀 , =  𝑉𝐷𝑀 ,𝑉𝑂𝑀 , + 𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝐺; (31) 
 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑇 , =  𝑉𝑆𝑇 ,𝑉𝑂𝑀 , + 𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝐺; (32) 
 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑋𝑀𝐷 , , =  𝑉𝑋𝑀𝐷 , ,𝑉𝑂𝑀 , + 𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝐺, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝐸𝐺. (33) 
Here, VDM is the total domestic service sales in Mexico, VST is the total service sales to 
the international transport sector, and VXMD is the total service export sales from 
Mexico to the U.S. and the rest of the world. 
Total immigrant smuggling services are represented as a share of the updated total 
services from Mexico in the following equation: 
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑇𝑈 =  𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑉𝑂𝑀 , + 𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑀𝐸𝑋_𝑅𝐸𝐺. (34) 
The market-clearing equation for service commodities, including the undocumented 
immigrant smuggling sector in Mexico, is the following (note: percent-change terms are 






Here, 𝑄𝑂 ,  represents the percent change in output quantity of services in Mexico, 𝑄𝐷𝑆 ,  represents the percent change in domestic sales of services in Mexico, 𝑄𝑆𝑇 ,  
represents the percent change in sales of services from Mexico to the international 
transport sector, 𝑄𝑋𝑆 , ,  represents the percent change in export sales of services from 
Mexico to the U.S. and rest of the world, and 𝑄𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 represents the percent change 
in quantity of smuggler services demanded.   
Next, we represent the demand for smuggling services and introduce a technical 
change variable that will represent an immigration policy shift.  We first introduce a 
variable, QTUNSEC, denoting the demand for smuggling services by sector j.  For 
notational simplicity, if we denote the percent change of unskilled, foreign, 
undocumented workers in sector j in the U.S. (i.e. 𝑄𝐹𝑈𝐸("𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑎𝑏", "𝑓𝑜𝑟", "𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔", 𝑗, "𝑈𝑆𝐴")) as 𝑄𝐹𝑈𝐸 , then we can define the sector-specific demand for smuggling services by the 
following equation in percentage-change terms: 𝑄𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶 =  −𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶 +  𝑄𝐹𝑈𝐸  𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀. (36) 
Here, 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶  is the sector-specific technical change variable that can simulate an 
immigration policy shift.  We define the aggregate demand (i.e. not sector-specific) for 
smuggler services in the following equation in percent-change terms: 
𝑄𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 =  𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑗∈𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑄𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶 . (37) 
The sector-specific price for smuggling services is directly related to the market price 





Here, 𝑃𝑀 ,  is the percent change in market price for services in Mexico.  The aggregate 
price (i.e. not sector-specific) for smuggler services is the following, in percent-change 
terms: 
𝑃𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 =  𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑗∈𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶 . (39) 
Since an immigration reform will affect smuggler demand in all sectors uniformly, we 
declare the following relationship: 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 =  𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀. (40) 
This variable 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 is exogenous in this model; therefore, the value of this percent-
change variable will be adjusted in order to account for the implementation of a market-
based immigration policy.  The values of the shocks on this variable are calibrated in the 
section 5.3. 
Next, we link the quantity of immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border to a change 
in the price of crossing.  We represent the value of smuggler services as a share of the 
sum of the value of unskilled immigrant labor across all sectors in the U.S. and the value 
of smuggler services: 
𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑀𝑈𝐺 =  𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶𝑉𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 + ∑ 𝑉𝐹𝐴𝑈∈ _  . (41) 
We represent the value of labor costs for undocumented immigrant labor as the remaining 
share: 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐶 =  1 − 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑀𝑈𝐺 . (42) 
We declare the variable 𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶_𝑈𝑆 as the non-sector-specific percent change in the 





𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶_𝑈𝑆 =  𝑉𝐹𝐴𝑈∑ 𝑉𝐹𝐴𝑈∈ _ ∗ 𝑃𝐹𝑈𝐸∈ _ . (43) 
Here, 𝑃𝐹𝑈𝐸 = 𝑃𝐹𝑈𝐸("𝑈𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑎𝑏", "𝑓𝑜𝑟", "𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔", 𝑗, "𝑈𝑆𝐴") is the percent change in the 
price of unskilled, foreign, undocumented immigrant labor in sector j in the U.S.  With 
this aggregate variable denoting the percent change in undocumented immigrant wages in 
the U.S., we can link the price of smuggling services to changes in the unskilled labor 
wage in Mexico through the following equation: 𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶_𝑈𝑆 =  𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑀𝑈𝐺 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 + 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑀 , , 𝑖 = "𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑙𝑎𝑏", 𝑟 = "𝑀𝐸𝑋". (44) 
 
5.3 Understanding the Marginal Impacts of Changes to Smuggler Prices 
Before using this model to determine the endogenous labor movement based on the 
price of the smuggling sector, it is useful to examine the marginal impacts of increased 
migration.  By targeting marginal increases in the number of new immigrants in the 
model, we can analyze the effects on the size and price of smuggling services, relative 
unskilled wage rates across the two countries, and the incidence for Mexican immigrant 
workers.  Table 5.1 depicts these values when the model targets a range of additional 









Table 5.1 General Equilibrium Effects: Targeting Between 100 Thousand and 1 Million 





































0.1 0.984 -1.642 0.963 -3.664 0.232 -0.230 0.501 
0.2 0.967 -3.253 0.928 -7.164 0.463 -0.457 0.503 
0.3 0.952 -4.833 0.895 -10.506 0.693 -0.681 0.505 
0.4 0.936 -6.382 0.863 -13.698 0.923 -0.901 0.506 
0.5 0.921 -7.899 0.833 -16.748 1.152 -1.117 0.508 
0.6 0.906 -9.384 0.803 -19.661 1.379 -1.331 0.509 
0.7 0.892 -10.838 0.776 -22.446 1.606 -1.542 0.510 
0.8 0.877 -12.261 0.749 -25.107 1.831 -1.750 0.511 
0.9 0.863 -13.652 0.723 -27.651 2.054 -1.955 0.512 
1 0.850 -15.012 0.699 -30.083 2.276 -2.157 0.513 
 
In these scenarios, the model is not exogenously moving immigrants in increments of 
100 thousand; rather, the model code allows us to “swap” the exogenous variable (i.e. the 
technical change variable in the smuggling sector, ATUNDOC) with the endogenous 
variable denoting the number of new immigrants in the U.S. (in the GMig2-U model, this 
variable is c_NMIGSPU).  By doing this, we can select a target of new immigrants in the 
model, and the model will calibrate the appropriate shock to ATUNDOC to generate this 
result.  The model uses the exogenous smuggling sector technical change variable to 
change the price of smuggling services and consequently change the total number of new 
immigrants.  Therefore, we can examine the results in Table 5.1 as the general 
equilibrium immigration results of changing the cost of smuggler services at the U.S.-
Mexico border. 
As higher numbers of new immigrants are targeted, the total dependence on the 
smuggling sector decreases by more than one percent for each additional 100 thousand 





An influx of a million new immigrants into the U.S. is associated with a decrease of 15 
percent in the quantity of smuggler services demanded and a decrease of 30 percent in the 
price of smugger services.  More precisely, this can be interpreted in the following way: 
an increase in the efficiency of the smuggling service sector mimicking a relaxation of 
population movement restrictions (i.e. a shock to ATUNDOC) that decreases the price of 
smuggling services by 30 percent (i.e. 𝑃𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 = -30) will lead to a decrease in the 
size of the smuggling services market of 15 percent (i.e. 𝑄𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 = -15) and an 
increase of total new immigrants from Mexico to the U.S. totaling 1 million people (i.e. 
c_NMIGSPU = 1).  The effects of a change in smuggler service quantity and prices on 
population changes are depicted in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. 
 




































Figure 5.3 Changes in Immigrant Population Relative to Changes in Smuggler Prices 
The effects of changes in the smuggling sector on incoming immigrant populations 
are nearly linear.  Thus, we can say with relative accuracy that a policy which reduces the 
quantity of smuggler services by 10 percent will result in 600 thousand new migrants, 
and a policy which reduces the price of smuggler services by 10 percent will result in 300 
thousand new migrants, based on these experiments. 
Another interesting result is the movement of relative unskilled wages in the two 
countries: the changes in response to population shifts, although different in sign, are 
nearly equal in magnitude.  Figure 5.4 demonstrates the percent changes in the average 
Mexican unskilled labor wage rate and the average unskilled immigrant labor wage rate 

































Figure 5.4 Changes in Wage Rates in Mexico and U.S. Unskilled Sectors after 
Immigration Shocks 
In this model, an influx of 1 million new immigrants from Mexico to the U.S. results 
in a decrease of 2.16 percent in the labor wage rates of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. 
unskilled sectors, and an increase of 2.28 percent in the labor wage rates for unskilled 
workers in Mexico.  As such, the incidence of Mexican immigrant workers is 0.513, 
meaning that approximately 51.3 percent of the benefits of this relaxation on population 
movement accrues to Mexican immigrant workers, and 48.7 accrues to the producers in 
the U.S. unskilled sectors. 
This is very different from the wage changes and incidence for Mexican immigrant 
labor seen in the results for the agriculture partial equilibrium model in Chapter 4.  This 
is likely a consequence of the differences between a partial equilibrium model with a 
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general equilibrium model has more scope for adjustment, and therefore, a more elastic 
unskilled labor demand. Additionally, in the general equilibrium model, the labor wage 
rate for Mexican immigrants working in unskilled U.S. sectors is a weighted average 
across agriculture and non-agriculture sectors.  Unskilled labor demand in the non-
agriculture sectors is substantially more elastic than the labor demand in the agriculture 
sectors.  Since these sectors employ an estimated 95 percent of the total undocumented 
labor force, these effects outweigh the agriculture market effects (see Passel and Cohn, 
2015a).   
The general equilibrium model also affects the supply side: the excess labor supply 
from Mexico (i.e. the immigrant labor supply in the U.S.) is elastic, although not as 
elastic as depicted in the partial equilibrium model.  This is because the general 
equilibrium model depicts a much larger economy and more scope for adjustment.  Thus, 
the labor market impacts of an immigrant influx are less drastic in the general equilibrium 
model, but we can still use the partial equilibrium results in the U.S. agriculture labor 
market to calibrate the shocks in the general equilibrium model.   
 
5.4 Policy Scenarios 
In order to mirror the policy scenarios carried out in the partial equilibrium model in 
Chapter 4, we first calibrate shocks to the variable  𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐶 with the shocks placed on 
the additive tax on Mexican agricultural wages in Chapter 4.  Since the partial 
equilibrium model in Chapter 4 focused on the labor market impacts in the U.S. 
agriculture sector, I calibrate the respective policy shifts in the CGE model by matching 





values for the field crops, fruits and vegetables, and livestock sectors) in the GMig2-U 
model to the partial equilibrium effects of the U.S. agriculture sector in the SIMPLE-
MIG model.  Table 5.2 summarizes the general equilibrium experiments. 












Partial Equilibrium Model 
Level of τLABMEX 0 0.0594 0.3588 0.2743 0.4663 
Ag. Sector %Δ QMXLABOR 83.8 69.5 24.0 33.8 13.9 
General Equilibrium Model      
 %Δ ATUNDOC Shock 503 370 82.5 128.5 42.5 
Field Crops %Δ QFUE 82.3225 68.399 23.7644 33.3639 13.7195 
Fruits and Vegetables %Δ QFUE 83.5014 69.4027 24.0831 33.8341 13.8907 
Livestock %Δ QFUE 87.3424 72.144 24.5899 34.6655 14.1366 
Weighted Average Ag. Sector 
%Δ QFUE 83.8 69.5 24.0 33.8 13.9 
 
Of particular importance in this table is the fact that the percent change in 
QMXLABOR—i.e., the quantity demanded of undocumented immigrant labor from Mexico 
in U.S. agriculture—in the partial equilibrium model is equal to the percent change in 
QFUE(Unsklab,for,ileg,j,USA) for j ϵ (Field Crops, Fruits and Vegetables, Livestock)—
i.e., the quantity demanded of unskilled, foreign, undocumented labor in the U.S. 
agriculture sector—in the general equilibrium model.  Shocks to ATUNDOC were 
chosen so that the percent change in Mexican immigrant labor in U.S. agriculture 
matches across both models.  Table 5.3 describes the intended interpretation of these 
policy scenarios, in terms of the visa pricing scheme and the reduction of the indirect 







Table 5.3 Qualitative Description of Immigration Policy Scenarios 
Policy 





Experiment 1 Perfectly-competitive smuggler cost: $1,082 100% 370 
Experiment 2 Upper bound of smuggler cost: $5,000 100% 82.5 
Experiment 3 Perfectly-competitive smuggler cost: $1,082 50% 128.5 
Experiment 4 Upper bound of smuggler cost: $5,000 50% 42.5 
A couple of concerns exist with this calibration of shocks.  Firstly, the partial 
equilibrium model assumes that agricultural output is fixed while it is not (by definition) 
in the general equilibrium model.  Consequently, the demand for labor in the partial 
equilibrium model is necessarily more inelastic, leading to an incidence calculation that 
benefits the demander of labor far more than the supplier of labor.  The general 
equilibrium calculation of incidence is expected to show that the policy shift benefits 
both the labor demander and labor supplier more equally than the partial equilibrium 
results suggest.  Secondly, targeting the change in agricultural employment as a 
simulation driver may cause the model to drive a large endogenous migration to satisfy 
the relatively small agriculture employment demands.  Both of these issues must be 
addressed in future versions of this work.  However, the results of this model currently 
align with the intuition of the literature surrounding undocumented and low-skill labor 
migration. 
 
5.5 CGE Results and Discussion 
When examining the results of the general equilibrium experiments, especially in 
light of the partial equilibrium results discussed in Chapter 4, it is important to recall the 
fundamental differences in the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models.  





assumes that agricultural output is fixed, while the CGE model assumes agricultural 
output (and output for all sectors) is endogenous.  The fixed output in the PE model 
causes the agriculture sector to have more inelastic labor demand, whereas in the CGE 
model, output can adjust, thereby making the derived demand for labor more elastic in 
the agriculture sector.  This will have profound effects on the change in wages for 
undocumented immigrants in U.S. agriculture and the tax incidence calculation. 
In this general equilibrium model, Experiment 1 represents the largest changes in 
both the U.S. and the Mexican economies, and Experiment 4 represents the smallest labor 
market impacts.  Since the change in effects between Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 is 
consistently monotonic and the range of possible results of the implementation of a 
market-based immigration policy is bounded by the results of Experiments 1 and 4 (as 
upper and lower bounds, respectively), I will compare these two scenarios in this section. 
Table 5.4 depicts the general equilibrium labor market effects of the four distinct 
immigration policy scenarios described in Table 5.3 above.  The quantity demanded of 
aggregate unskilled labor (without regard to country of origin or legal status) increases by 
0.9-4.7 percent in the U.S., and decreases by 2.8-15.4 percent in Mexico.  All U.S. 
sectors face an increase in the quantity of unskilled labor demanded; the largest growth in 
U.S. employment occurs in the construction, food processing, and services sectors, which 
employ the largest share of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (Passel and Cohn, 
2015a).  In Mexico, except for the heavy manufacturing sector, all sectors face negative 
changes in unskilled employment as a result of the policy scenarios.  The largest changes 
in unskilled employment occur in the services, food processing, and construction sectors 





1.4 percent in the U.S. and increases by 2.6-11.4 in Mexico.  Breaking this down into 
industry-level changes, in the U.S., the largest wages decreases occur in agriculture and 
construction. 
Table 5.5 depicts the general equilibrium labor market effects of the immigration 
policy scenarios, with particular focus on the substitution of foreign and domestic labor.  
In both the U.S. and Mexico, the quantity demanded of unskilled domestic labor 
decreases for all but one sector (services in the U.S., and heavy manufacturing in 
Mexico).  In the U.S., the largest changes occur in the field crops, fruits and vegetables, 
and livestock sectors (which form the agricultural industry).  In Mexico, the largest 
changes occur in the services, food processing, and meat processing sectors.  The decline 
in domestic unskilled labor in the two countries is likely not motivated by the same 
reasons; domestic unskilled workers in the U.S. are relatively more expensive than 
immigrant labor, whereas the decline in unskilled labor demand in Mexico is likely 
fueled by the decline in native population due to the migration policy shift.  The loss of 
domestic unskilled labor in the Mexican services sector is especially large—between 24.2 
and 77 percent loss.  This may reveal why the services sector employs the largest share of 
immigrants in the U.S.: it is likely that immigrants will seek employment in unskilled 
sectors in which they previously worked. 
In contrast, the quantity demanded of unskilled foreign workers in the U.S. increased 
consistently across all sectors.  Immigrant unskilled labor is less expensive than domestic 
unskilled labor, which explains the stark contrast in employment patterns.  Although the 
wages of unskilled workers in the U.S. decrease for both foreign and domestic workers, 





decrease by 1.87-8.48 percent in agriculture, 1.57-7.36 percent in manufacturing, 1.79-
8.19 percent in construction, and 1.27-6.15 percent in services.  This explains the large 
contrast between the quantity demanded of unskilled domestic and foreign workers in the 
U.S. 
Table 5.6 represents the general equilibrium labor market effects of the immigration 
policy scenarios, with a particular focus on undocumented labor in the U.S. (or, more 
accurately, the population of immigrants who would enter the country illegally without 
the implementation of a market-based immigration policy).  As a result of the policy shift, 
between 1.134 million and 6.302 million individuals from Mexico’s population migrate 
to the United States, depending on the scenario.  As expected, the percent change in 
quantity demanded of unskilled, “undocumented” workers is positive and large in all 
sectors of the U.S., across all four scenarios.  The largest increases in quantity demand of 
unskilled, “undocumented” labor occur in the services, heavy manufacturing, light 
manufacturing, and construction services.  Consequently, the aggregate wages of 
unskilled, “undocumented” workers in U.S. sectors fall between 2.4 and 10.3 percent.  
Regardless of the percent decrease in unskilled, “undocumented” wages in the U.S., the 
total quantity of remittances sent back to Mexico increases by between 14.4 and 74.5 
percent. 
Table 5.7 depicts “back of the envelope” calculations of income changes experienced 
by individual workers in the United States, including new low-skill immigrants from 
Mexico, undocumented immigrants working in U.S. low-skill industries prior to the 
policy shift, legally-present immigrants working in U.S. low-skill industries prior to the 





high-skill industries, and domestic workers in U.S. high-skill industries.  This table lists 
the revenue change for the average individual in U.S. dollars.  Table 5.8 depicts similar 
“back of the envelope” calculations of income changes, aggregated across the distinct 
groups of workers described above.  This table lists the total income change for all 
workers in each group in millions of U.S. dollars.   
For new unskilled immigrants coming to the U.S. after the policy reform, the increase 
in individual income is calculated by the following formula: (Average Annual Income 
Received by Unskilled, Undocumented Workers in the U.S.) * [1 + (Percent Change in 
Unskilled, Undocumented Wages in the U.S. / 100)] – (Average Annual Income 
Received by Unskilled Workers in Mexico) * [1 + (Percent Change in Unskilled Wages 
in Mexico / 100)].  For new unskilled immigrants as a group, the total income change is 
calculated by the following formula: (Individual Income Change for New Unskilled 
Immigrants) / (Total Number of New Immigrants Entering the U.S.). 
For the remaining groups that were working in the U.S. prior to the policy shift, the 
group income change is calculated by the following formula: (Pre-Reform Value of 
Wages Paid to Entire Group) * (Percent Change in Wages Paid to this Group / 100).  The 
income change for the individuals in each respective group is calculated by the following 
formula: (Group Income Change) / [(Pre-Reform Total Number of Workers in Group) * 
[1 + (Percent Change in Total Number of Workers in this Group / 100)].  This formula is 
applied to calculate income changes for undocumented immigrants working in unskilled 
industries, foreign-born individuals legally working in unskilled industries, domestic 
workers in unskilled industries, foreign-born individuals legally working in high-skill 





As individuals, new immigrants coming from Mexico to the U.S. labor force see the 
largest revenue change: an increase of between $12,092 and $13,873 for those entering 
the U.S. agriculture labor market and an increase of between $13,985 and $16,453 for 
those entering the U.S. non-agriculture labor market.  As a group, new immigrants from 
Mexico will gain substantially: between $18.6 billion and $87.9 billion, depending on the 
scenario.   
The influx of low-skilled Mexican immigrants decreases wages for low-skill, 
undocumented immigrants working in the U.S. prior to the policy shift, low-skill, legally-
present immigrants, and low-skill, domestic workers.  The negative income effects are 
more pronounced for foreign-born workers, and more so for undocumented workers. 
 Individual annual incomes decline by between $542.67 and $1,603.81 for 
undocumented immigrants working in the U.S. prior to the policy shift, and by $97.6 
million to $414.7 million as a group for those working in agriculture, and by $3.9 billion 
and $16.7 billion as a group for those working in non-agriculture sectors.  For unskilled, 
legally-present immigrants, individual annual incomes decrease by between $205.15 and 
$1,507.21 and total incomes as a group fall by between $15.9 million and $77.7 million 
in agriculture and by between $1.8 billion and $8.98 billion in non-agriculture sectors.  
For unskilled, domestic workers, individual annual incomes decrease by between $24.13 
and $186.25 and total incomes as a group fall by between $15.6 million and $103 million 
in agriculture and by between $2 billion and $13.3 billion in non-agriculture sectors.   
However, the influx of new, low-skilled immigrants has a substantial expansionary 
effect on high-skill wages in the United States.  These increase collectively by between 





billion and $47.3 billion for domestic, high-skill workers.  This wage growth for skilled 
workers in the U.S., together with new immigrants’ revenue growth, largely exceeds the 
revenue declines faced by undocumented immigrants working in the U.S. prior to the 
policy shift, legally-present immigrants, and low-skill domestic workers. 
Finally, Table 5.9 depicts the “back of the envelope” general equilibrium revenue 
changes for smugglers, the U.S. government, and producers in U.S. and Mexico, given 
the impacts of the four immigration policy scenarios.  Revenue changes for U.S. and 
Mexican producers are calculated as follows: Net Change in Value of Wages Paid + Net 
Change in Value of Sales at Market Prices.  Revenue losses for smugglers are calculated 
as follows: (Average Price of Perfectly-Competitive Smuggler Services * Total Number 
of New Migrants Gaining Employment in the Agriculture Sectors) + (Average Price of 
Monopolistically-Competitive Smuggler Services * Total Number of New Migrants 
Gaining Employment in the Non-Agriculture Sectors), where the average price of 
perfectly-competitive smugglers is $1,082 per person and the average price of 
monopolistically-competitive smugglers is $2,486 per person.  For the U.S. Government, 
the revenue change is calculated using the following formula: (Visa Price for Mexican 
Nationals * Total Number of New Migrants), where the visa price is $1,082 in 
experiments 1 and 3 and $5,000 in experiments 2 and 4. 
Smugglers lose between $2.78 billion and $15.48 billion in revenue; monopolistically 
competitive smugglers absorb the overwhelming majority of this loss.  The U.S. 
government gains between $2.17 billion and $6.8 billion when visa prices equal the 





$5.67 billion and $14.36 billion when visa prices equal the upper bound of recorded 
smuggler costs (i.e. $5,000 per person). 
In both the U.S. and Mexico, total revenues for producers as a whole increased 
substantially.  However, the clear winners in these simulations are U.S. producers, 
specifically U.S. producers in non-agriculture sectors, whose revenues increase by 
between $55.58 billion and $294.75 billion.  These producers gain from the reduction in 
total labor costs and the large increase in total sales.  Producers in Mexico, however, face 
a substantial increase in labor costs and a large reduction of demand for agricultural 
goods.  In fact, total sales for Mexican agricultural goods decrease by between $927.5 
million and $10.4 billion.  This is a consequence of the large shift in population to the 
U.S.; although total sales in non-agriculture sectors increase by between $12 billion and 
$51.6 billion, a large portion of this production expansion is driven by an increase in 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.7 “Back of the Envelope” Income Changes for Individual Workers in the United 
States Given the General Equilibrium Results 
Group Affected 
Individual Income Changes  
(U.S. Dollars) 
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 
New Unskilled Immigrants Entering the U.S. 
Agriculture Labor Force from Mexico 
12,091.51 13,170.51 13,490.67 13,873.16 
New Immigrants Entering the U.S. Non-
agriculture Labor Force from Mexico 
13,985.14 15,477.20 15,922.76 16,452.95 
Unskilled, Undocumented Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-1,603.81 -1,090.69 -863.71 -562.29 
Unskilled, Undocumented Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Non-Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-1,359.36 -1,002.55 -812.81 -542.67 
Unskilled, Legally-present, Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-1,170.69 -523.15 -363.87 -205.15 
Unskilled, Legally-present, Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Non-Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-1,507.21 -730.43 -520.13 -300.74 
Unskilled Domestic Workers in U.S. Ag -186.25 -70.22 -47.12 -26.02 
Unskilled Domestic Workers in U.S. Non-Ag -149.58 -61.83 -42.55 -24.13 
Skilled, Legally-present Immigrants Working in 
U.S. Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
1,171.22 461.19 312.81 172.73 
Skilled, Legally-present Immigrants Working in 
U.S. Non-Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
846.38 413.23 293.43 168.33 
Skilled Domestic Workers in U.S. Ag 1,070.72 521.78 370.33 212.36 














Table 5.8 “Back of the Envelope” Total Income Changes for Groups of Workers in the 
United States Given the General Equilibrium Results 
Group Affected 
Group Income Changes 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 
New Unskilled Immigrants Entering the U.S. Ag 
Labor Force from Mexico 
1,569.59 843.56 617.56 368.01 
New Unskilled Immigrants Entering the U.S. 
Non-Ag Labor Force from Mexico 
86,320.75 43,463.02 31,214.91 18,225.47 
Net New Unskilled Immigrants 87,890.35 44,306.57 31,832.47 18,593.48 
Unskilled, Undocumented Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-414.73 -222.55 -163.39 -97.64 
Unskilled, Undocumented Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Non-Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-16,714.22 -8,968.98 -6,584.88 -3,935.16 
Net Unskilled, Undocumented Immigrants -17,128.95 -9,191.52 -6,748.27 -4,032.81 
Unskilled, Legally-present, Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-77.73 -38.22 -27.34 -15.88 
Unskilled, Legally-present, Immigrants Working 
in U.S. Non-Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
-8,981.34 -4,416.52 -3,158.94 -1,835.44 
Net Unskilled, Legally-present Immigrant -9,059.07 -4,454.75 -3,186.28 -1,851.32 
Unskilled Domestic Workers in U.S. Ag -103.02 -40.83 -27.77 -15.55 
Unskilled Domestic Workers in U.S. Non-Ag -13,303.77 -5,273.18 -3,586.39 -2,008.16 
Net Unskilled Domestic Workers -13,406.79 -5,314.01 -3,614.16 -2,023.71 
Skilled, Legally-present Immigrants Working in 
U.S. Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
5.11 2.49 1.77 1.02 
Skilled, Legally-present Immigrants Working in 
U.S. Non-Ag Prior to the Policy Shift 
5,879.92 2,870.36 2,038.11 1,169.16 
Net Skilled, Legally-present Immigrants 5,885.03 2,872.85 2,039.89 1,170.17 
Skilled Domestic Workers in U.S. Ag 41.08 20.05 14.24 8.17 
Skilled Domestic Workers in U.S. Non-Ag 47,268.67 23,074.77 16,384.39 9,398.85 










Table 5.9 “Back of the Envelope” Revenue Changes for Smugglers, U.S. Government, 
and Producers in U.S. and Mexico Given the General Equilibrium Results 
Group Affected 
Revenue Changes 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 
Smugglers 
    
Perfectly Competitive Revenue Change -140.45 -69.30 -49.53 -28.70 
Monopolistically Competitive Rev. Change -15,344.38 -6,981.18 -4,873.54 -2,753.82 
Net Smuggler Revenue Changes -15,484.84 -7,050.48 -4,923.07 -2,782.53 
U.S. Government 
    
Net Visa Revenues 6,818.90 14,361.23 2,107.68 5,671.30 




Reduction in Labor Costs 549.28 279.05 202.49 119.89 
Increase in Total Industry Sales 1,231.21 592.26 428.31 253.67 
Net Revenue Changes for U.S. Ag Producers 1,780.49 871.32 630.80 373.57 
U.S. Producers in Non-Agriculture Sectors 
    
Increase in Labor Costs 14,149.26 7,286.44 5,092.29 2,789.25 
Increase in Total Industry Sales 307,121.09 143,924.85 101,460.81 57,991.73 
Net Revenue Changes for U.S. Non-Ag 
Producers 
292,971.83 136,638.40 96,368.52 55,202.48 
Net Revenue Change for All U.S. Producers 294,752.32 137,509.72 96,999.32 55,576.04 
Mexican Producers in Agriculture Sectors 
    
Increase in Labor Costs 1,865.97 1,017.07 737.82 414.74 
Reduction in Total Industry Sales 10,388.84 3,282.14 1,977.76 927.54 
Net Revenue Changes for Mex Ag Producers -12,254.81 -4,299.21 -2,715.58 -1,342.27 
Mexican Producers in Non-Agriculture Sectors 
   
Increase in Labor Costs 2,939.89 1,652.56 1,203.06 401.83 
Increase in Total Industry Sales 51,648.46 28,900.15 20,871.55 12,006.57 
Net Revenue Changes for Mex Non-ag. 
Producers 
48,708.57 27,247.59 19,668.49 11,604.73 







CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY RELEVANCE, AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Reviewing the Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In this section, I look back at the specific research questions that I used to guide me 
along the development of this project, and analyze the hypotheses I made with the results 
of both models in mind.  Some of these questions are better answered by either the partial 
equilibrium or general equilibrium model, and some by both.   
My first research question explores the partial equilibrium effects on the U.S. 
agriculture labor market of implementing a market-based immigration policy for low-
skilled Mexican nationals.  My first hypothesis is that employment of Mexican 
immigrants will increase in U.S. agriculture, U.S. agriculture wages will decrease 
substantially, and Mexican agriculture wages will increase marginally.  The partial 
equilibrium results give this hypothesis validity: the total quantity of Mexican immigrant 
labor hired in U.S. agriculture increased by a minimum of 13.9 percent (or an additional 
28 thousand workers) and a maximum of 69.5 percent (or an additional 140 thousand 
workers).  Meanwhile, the U.S. price of agriculture labor faced by Mexican immigrants 
decreased by a minimum of 18.1 percent and a maximum of 55 percent, and the cost-of-
living-adjusted Mexican price of agriculture labor increased by a minimum of 3 percent 





My second research question is directed at understanding the direction of the largest 
benefits and losses with the implementation of this immigration policy.  My second 
hypothesis is that U.S. employers will benefit the most from this policy shift.  This 
hypothesis is best answered by examining the tax incidence of Mexican labor in both 
models.  In the partial equilibrium model, U.S. agricultural producers overwhelmingly 
benefit more than the Mexican immigrant labor force in the U.S.: the partial equilibrium 
incidence of labor is 0.156 at a minimum and 20.5 at a maximum, meaning that between 
15.6 percent and 20.5 percent of the benefit of this immigration policy accrues to the 
Mexican immigrant labor force; the rest accrues to the U.S. producers.  U.S. agricultural 
producers, for whom labor constitutes a large share of total production inputs, benefit 
largely from the influx of low-cost, high-efficiency immigrant labor from Mexico.  Based 
on the “back of the envelope” calculations of revenue changes, U.S. agriculture producers 
see an increase in total revenue between $862.2 million and $3.4 billion. 
New low-skill Mexican immigrants to the U.S. also benefit largely due to the jump in 
total income, with “back of the envelope” income changes between $4,269 and $11,084 
per capita and between $310.15 million and $597.10 million as a group.  These new 
migrants see a substantial increase in wages which serves to vastly improve the quality of 
life of the immigrant and the Mexican household, which will receive sizable remittances.  
Even so, the biggest winners in this model are U.S. agriculture producers.   
In the general equilibrium model, the benefits are distributed more equally between 
immigrant workers and U.S. employers in unskilled sectors.  Here, the benefits are 
slightly higher for immigrants: the incidence for immigrant labor ranged from a minimum 





the total benefits of the immigration policy shift accrue to Mexican immigrant workers in 
the United States.  The stark difference in the incidence of tax removal between the 
partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models can be explained by the sector output 
assumptions, as discussed above.  Since the output in the general equilibrium model is 
adjustable, total demand for unskilled, undocumented Mexican labor in U.S. sectors is 
more elastic while the excess supply of unskilled Mexican labor is less elastic due to the 
larger size of the economy.  Additionally, since non-agriculture sectors—which have an 
inherently more elastic price elasticity of labor demand than agriculture sectors—are 
included in the general equilibrium model, the production expansion effect is even 
greater.   
Among the various groups of workers in the U.S. labor market, the biggest winners in 
the general equilibrium results are the new unskilled immigrants entering the U.S. labor 
market, who gain between $12,092 and $16,453 in per capita income as a result of the 
immigration policy shift, or a gain of between $18.6 billion and $87.9 billion as a group.  
Skilled workers, both foreign-born and domestic, also gained from the policy shift, but in 
smaller amounts than the new unskilled immigrants.  All other unskilled workers in the 
U.S. face losses in net income as a result of the immigration policy shift, with the biggest 
loss accruing to unskilled, undocumented workers in the U.S. prior to the policy shift.  
These workers lose between $543 and $1,604 in per-capita income, and between $97.6 
million and $16.7 billion as a group.  The types of workers that are more substitutable 






Overall, the biggest winner in the general equilibrium results are U.S. producers, and 
specifically U.S. non-ag producers.  This is a somewhat surprising result, since U.S. non-
ag producers actually pay more for labor after the immigration policy shift.  However, the 
expansion effect (i.e. the large increase in output driven by an influx of total U.S. 
population) is responsible for a massive increase in total sales for this sector: between 
$55.2 billion and $292.97 billion. 
What is clear in both models is that Mexican producers in agriculture sectors are the 
largest losers: they face a smaller potential labor force and they must pay higher wages 
for unskilled labor as a consequence; they face a decrease in total revenues of between 
$1.3 billion and $12.3 billion.  Curiously, Mexican producers in non-agriculture sectors 
do not share the same fate: even with higher labor costs, an increase in non-agriculture 
exports to the U.S. fuels growth in total sales, so the net revenue is between $11.6 billion 
and $48.7 billion. 
My third research question is directed at understanding the effects of relative visa 
price differences for a market-based immigration policy.  My third hypothesis is that 
increasing the price of visas in this policy will not cause a substantial change in demand 
for U.S. visas by Mexican nationals.  To verify this hypothesis, we must compare 
Experiments 1 and 2 separately from Experiments 3 and 4 in both models, since the pairs 
assume the same reduction of indirect costs.  In the partial equilibrium model, the 
difference in total migration is nearly 72 thousand workers between Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2, under which visas cost $1,082 and $5,000, respectively.  This difference 
represents nearly 36 percent of the pre-reform equilibrium quantity of undocumented 





4 is nearly 21 thousand workers, or over 10 percent of the base level of immigrants in 
U.S. agriculture.  In the general equilibrium model, the difference between Experiments 1 
and 2 is 3.4 million workers, over 96 percent of the base number of undocumented 
Mexican immigrants working in U.S. unskilled sectors.  The difference between 
Experiments 3 and 4 is 872 thousand workers, or 24.5 percent of the base number of 
undocumented workers in the United States.  Based on these results, it seems a near-
$4,000 visa price difference deters a significant portion of potential Mexican immigrants, 
even though the excess labor supply from Mexico is highly elastic. 
 
6.2 Policy Relevance of this Study 
Although the aim of this project is not to propose a market-based immigration policy 
as an alternative for the current quota-based policy, there are many lessons that can be 
gleaned from this exercise.  I do not purport exactitude or precision in the results of these 
models; in fact, the wide ranges in all my results reflect the multitude of uncertainties 
inherent in the realm of U.S. immigration policy.  I am, however, certain that the 
direction of the results in this study is accurate.  More specifically, implementing an 
immigration policy that favors increased mobility of low-skilled Mexican nationals into 
the U.S. labor market at an established price will largely benefit the U.S. economy, 
decrease the dependence on illegal smuggling services, and reduce the need for large-
scale, militarized border patrol efforts. 
If a market-based immigration policy were to be implemented, there are many 
nuanced decisions that must be made.  What price is appropriate? Whom should the 





Mexican immigrants be treated like permanent residents or temporary workers?  Should 
the implementation of such a policy only extend to the citizens of Mexico?  The scopes of 
many of these questions extend beyond the explanatory powers of economic analysis and 
quickly require complex considerations of humanity and foreign relations.    
 
6.3 Direction for Future Research 
Future work must involve a more rigorous calibration of the indirect costs of illegal 
immigration; this is truly the largest determinant of the wide range of results in both the 
partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models.  This will involve in-depth survey 
work that takes advantage of the latest advances in behavioral economics. 
This study attempts to go one step further in analyzing an aspect of undocumented 
immigration that is largely missing from the body of academic literature, i.e. the illegal 
immigrant smuggling sector at the U.S.-Mexico border.  However, the internal business 
structure of modern, highly-organized, monopolistically-competitive smuggling networks 
is largely unknown to researchers.  In order to more fully understand this organization, 
more data on the specific costs and benefits of using certain smugglers is required. 
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
Although far from politically-feasible, understanding the economic and labor market 
effects of a market-based immigration policy between the U.S. and Mexico is an 
important undertaking.  The methods in this thesis, though fairly rudimentary, reveal the 
potential benefits of enacting immigration reform in the United States.  The partial 





assumptions—some imported from the extensive literature on immigration, and others 
born from an informed intuition.  The lack of complete data is a challenge that uniquely 
applies to research in undocumented immigration, and consequently requires the use of 
vast assumptions.  Regardless, the results from both of these models align with the 
conclusions reached by most studies on the labor market impacts of immigrants.  Namely, 
U.S. producers in unskilled sectors—mostly those in the agriculture industry—would 
benefit hugely from the efficiency gain of an influx of low-cost, high-efficiency unskilled 
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Appendix A Partial Equilibrium Model: Tablo Code 
This appendix outlines the code used to run the partial equilibrium model in RunGEM. 
!   I. PRELIMINARIES   ! 
!   Declaration of base data and parameters.   ! 
File   MIGDATA # file containing all base data #; 
       MIGPARM # file containing all parameters #; 
!   Declaration of slack variables.   ! 
Variable slack_plabmx 
    #slack variable for fixing Mexican migrant labor (MXLABOR) input price#; 
Variable slack_pother 
    # slack variable for fixing other input price #; 
!   II. CONSUMER DEMAND SYSTEM   ! 
!   Note: Consumer demand and total US crop output are exogenous and fixed.  There is 
no need for consumer demand equations.   ! 
!   II.A. CROP USE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM   ! 
!   Quantity of crops   ! 
Variable (levels) QCROP 
    # US crop production (in M MT "normalized" quantities) #;  




!   III. PRODUCTION SYSTEM   ! 
!   III.A. CROP PRODUCTION SYSTEM   ! 
!   III.A.1. Coefficients & Variables Related to Crop Production   ! 
!   Elasticity of substitution between MXLABOR & other inputs in US agriculture   ! 
Coefficient (Parameter) ECROP 
    # Global elasticity of subs. in prod. of crops #;  
!   Value and price of crops   ! 
Variable (levels) VCROP 
    # Value of crop production (in M USD at 2007 prices) #; 
Variable (levels) PCROP 
    # World crop price in USD per tonne (at 2007 prices) #; 
!   III.A.2. Coefficients & Variables Related to MXLABOR Demand/Supply   ! 
!   Price elasticities of MXLABOR & other factors   ! 
Coefficient (Parameter) EOTHER 
    # Price elasticity of other input supply with respect to other input rents #; 
Coefficient (Parameter) ELABMEX 
    # Price elasticity of MXLABOR supply with respect to wages #; 
 !   Cost share of MXLABOR & other inputs   ! 
Coefficient SHROTHER 
    # Cost share of other inputs in crop production #; 
Coefficient SHRMXLABOR 





!   Values, quantities and prices of MXLABOR & other inputs used in crop production   ! 
Variable (levels) QOTHER 
    # Quantity of Non-MXLABOR inputs #; 
Variable (levels) VOTHER 
    # Value of Non-MXLABOR inputs (in M USD at 2007 prices) #; 
Variable (levels) POTHER 
    # Non-MXLABOR input rents (in 1000 USD at 2007 prices per hectare) #; 
Variable (levels) QMXLABOR 
    # Quantity of MXLABOR inputs (in M USD at 2007 prices) #; 
Variable (levels) VMXLABOR 
    # Value of MXLABOR inputs (same as QMXLABOR) #; 
Variable (levels) PMXLABOR 
    # Price index of MXLABOR inputs #; 
Variable (levels) PLABINMEX 
    # Price index of labor in Mexican agriculture #; 
Variable (levels) COLADJUST 
    # COL adjustment for MX labor working in US agriculture #; 
!   Effective rate of taxation on wages in Mexican agriculture used to drive endogenous 
migration decision   ! 
Variable  (levels) TRANSMXLABOR 






Read QOTHER      from file MIGDATA header "QLD"; 
           VOTHER      from file MIGDATA header "VOTH"; 
           QMXLABOR    from file MIGDATA header "QMXL"; 
           PMXLABOR    from file MIGDATA header "PMXL"; 
          EOTHER      from file MIGPARM header "EOTH"; 
           ELABMEX    from file MIGPARM header "EMXL"; 
          ECROP       from file MIGPARM header "ECRP"; 
           PLABINMEX     from file MIGDATA header "PLMX"; 
           COLADJUST     from file MIGDATA header "COL"; 
!   Formulas and equation defining changes in the values and prices of OTHER and 
MXLABOR inputs   ! 
Formula (initial) POTHER = VOTHER/QOTHER; 
Equation E_VOTHER p_VOTHER = p_POTHER + p_QOTHER; 
Formula (initial) 
![[! Formula & Equation E_VMXLABOR !]]! 
VMXLABOR = PMXLABOR * QMXLABOR; 
Equation (linear) E_VMXLABOR ! linearised by TABLO ! 
p_VMXLABOR = p_PMXLABOR + p_QMXLABOR ; 
!   Formulas for calculating the initial values of VCROP & PCROP   ! 
Formula (initial) VCROP = VMXLABOR + VOTHER; 





!   Formulas and equations for deriving cost shares & definition of yields, value & 
technological change   ! 
Formula SHROTHER = VOTHER / ( VMXLABOR + VOTHER ); 
Formula SHRMXLABOR = (1 - SHROTHER) ; 
Equation E_VCROP  p_VCROP = p_PCROP + p_QCROP; 
!   III.A.3. Variables Related to Technical Change in Crop Production   ! 
Variable (levels) AOCROP 
    # sub-comp. of Hicks-neutral eff. index: global #; 
Variable (levels) AFOTHER 
    # other-input-biased eff. index in crop production #; 
Variable (levels) AFMXLABOR 
    # sub-comp. of MXLABOR-biased eff. index: global #; 
!   Formulas initializing values of tech. change variables   ! 
Formula (initial)                       AFOTHER        = 1; 
Formula (initial)                       AOCROP         = 1; 
Formula (initial)                       AFMXLABOR      = 1; 
!   III.A.4. Key Equations on MXLABOR Demand/Supply & Crop Production   ! 
!   III.A.4.1. Long Run Supply for Non-MXLABOR Inputs into US Crops   ! 
Equation E_POTHER 
    # determines the endogenous price of other inputs in crop production # 






!   III.A.4.2. Long Run Supply for MXLABOR Inputs into US Crops   ! 
Equation E_PMXLABOR 
    # determines the endogenous price of MXLABOR inputs used in US ag. # 
    p_QMXLABOR = ELABMEX * p_PLABINMEX + slack_plabmx ; 
!   III.A.4.3. Long Run Derived Demand Equation for Non-MXlABOR inputs   ! 
Equation E_QOTHER 
    # determines the endogenous use of other inputs (e.g., land) # 
    p_QOTHER + p_AFOTHER  =  p_QCROP - p_AOCROP 
        - ECROP * [p_POTHER - p_AFOTHER - p_PCROP - p_AOCROP]; 
!   III.A.4.4. Long Run Derived Demand Equation for MXLABOR Inputs   ! 
Equation E_QMXLABOR 
    # determines the endogenous use of MXLABOR in US crop production # 
    p_QMXLABOR + p_AFMXLABOR  =  p_QCROP - p_AOCROP 
        - ECROP * [p_PMXLABOR - p_AFMXLABOR - p_PCROP - p_AOCROP]; 
!   III.A.4.5. Unit Cost Condition for Crop Producers   ! 
! Note that we do not impose 'zero profits' as we are fixing output.   ! 
Equation E_PCROP 
    # determines the unit cost of ag. commodites in US # 
    p_PCROP + p_AOCROP = 
                       [SHROTHER] * [p_POTHER - p_AFOTHER] + 






!   III.A.4.6. Mexican Labor Migration Equation   ! 
Formula (initial) 
![[! Formula & Equation (levels) E_TRANSMXLABOR !]]! 
  # determines the endogenous shift in QMXLABOR following wage equilibriation # 
TRANSMXLABOR = PMXLABOR - COLADJUST*PLABINMEX ;  
Equation (Linear) E_TRANSMXLABOR ! linearised by TABLO ! 
# determines the endogenous shift in QMXLABOR following wage equilibriation # 
     TRANSMXLABOR * p_TRANSMXLABOR = PMXLABOR * p_PMXLABOR - 





Appendix B Additions to GMig2-U CGE Model: Tablo Code 
This appendix outlines the additions to the GMig2-U code to run the general equilibrium 
model on RunGTAP. 
!   These sets are required for the separate handling of Mexican services which is used as 
a margin to smuggle undocumented migrants into US employment.  They allow a 
separate market clearing equation to be defined for Mexico's services sectors.   ! 
Set MEX_REG  # Single region set for Mexico # (MEX); 
Subset MEX_REG is subset of REG; 
Set NMEX_REG # Complement to MEX_REG # 
            = REG - MEX_REG; 
Set USA_REG  # Single region set for USA # (USA); 
Subset USA_REG is subset of REG; 
Set NUSA_REG # Complement to MEX_REG # 
            = REG - USA_REG; 
Set SERV_COMM  # Single commodity set for services # (servcs); 
Subset SERV_COMM is subset of MARG_COMM; 
Set NSERV_COMM # Complement to SERV_COMM # 
            = TRAD_COMM - SERV_COMM; 
Set NMARG_COMM # Complement to SERV_COMM # 





Set UNLAB_COMM # Single commodity set for unskilled labor # (UnSkLab); 
Subset UNLAB_COMM is subset of LAB_COMM; 
Set NUNLAB_COMM # Complement to UNLAB_COMM # 
            = LAB_COMM - UNLAB_COMM; 
Set UNDOC_LAB # Single commodity set for undocumented workers # (ileg); 
Subset UNDOC_LAB is subset of UNSK; 
Set NUNDOC_LAB # Complement to UNDOC_LAB # 
            = UNSK - UNDOC_LAB; 
!   VTUNDOC adds to "services" use since that is the "person moving margin" 
commodity. To balance the database, VTUNDOC needs to be added to the output/ cost of 
the service sector in Mexico. This will be done by adding the amount VTUNDOC to the 
labor and capital endowment of Mexico for use in the services sector. VTUNDOC is 
allocated across sectors using the labor demand value shares for undocumented workers 
in the US. ! 
Coefficient (ge 0) VTUNDOC # value of services used in moving undoc from 
Mexico to US #; 
Formula   
VTUNDOC =  
sum(jj,PROD_COMM,VFAU("Unsklab","for","ileg",jj,"USA")) – 
sum(kk,PROD_COMM, VFMU("Unsklab","for","ileg",kk,"USA")); 
!   Average cost index for margin services used in getting undocumented workers from 




**Note--this will be set equal to the market price for Mexican services in a direct variable 
= variable equation.   ! 
Variable ptundoc # cost index for migrant smuggle from Mexico to US #; 
!   These margin variables give the qty of services used to move an undocumented worker 
from Mexico to US. qtunsec(j) is proportional to the change in demand for an 
undocumented worker in a US sector.   ! 
Variable qtundoc     # aggregate qty index of smuggling undoc workers  #; 
Coefficient (ge 0) VTUNDOC # value of services used in moving undoc from 
Mexico to US #; 
Update  VTUNDOC = ptundoc * qtundoc; 
Read  VTUNDOC from file GTAPDATA header "VTUD"; 
!   ELCHK - hard code matches current definitions for set elements   ! 
Coefficient (ge 0)    (all,j,PROD_COMM) VFMUSMEX (j) # value of unskilled,undoc 
migrant work by US sector j #; 
Formula (all,j,PROD_COMM)  
VFMUSMEX(j) = VFMU("unsklab","for","ileg",j,"USA");  
Coefficient (ge 0)  (all,j,PROD_COMM) VTUNSHR(j); 
Formula (all,j,PROD_COMM) 
VTUNSHR(j) = VTUNDOC * 
VFMUSMEX(j)/sum(jj,PROD_COMM,VFMUSMEX(jj)) ; 
Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 





    SHRDM(i,r) = VDM(i,r) / VOM(i,r); 
Formula (all,i,NSERV_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG) 
    SHRDM(i,r) = VDM(i,r) / VOM(i,r); 
Formula (all,i,SERV_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG) 
    SHRDM(i,r) = VDM(i,r) / {VOM(i,r) + VTUNDOC}; 
Coefficient (all,m,MARG_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    SHRST(m,r) # share of sales of m to global transport services in r #; 
Formula (all,m,MARG_COMM)(all,r,NMEX_REG) 
    SHRST(m,r) = VST(m,r) / VOM(m,r); 
Formula (all,m,NMARG_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG) 
    SHRST(m,r) = VST(m,r) / VOM(m,r); 
Formula (all,m,SERV_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG) 
    SHRST(m,r) = VST(m,r) / {VOM(m,r) + VTUNDOC}; 
Coefficient (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG) 
    SHRXMD(i,r,s) # share of export sales of i to s in r #; 
Formula (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,NMEX_REG)(all,s,REG) 
    SHRXMD(i,r,s) = VXMD(i,r,s) / VOM(i,r); 
Formula (all,i,NSERV_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG)(all,s,REG) 
    SHRXMD(i,r,s) = VXMD(i,r,s) / VOM(i,r); 
Formula (all,i,SERV_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG)(all,s,REG) 
    SHRXMD(i,r,s) = VXMD(i,r,s) / {VOM(i,r) + VTUNDOC}; 





    SHRVTU(r) # share of transport undocumented margins #; 
Formula (all,r,MEX_REG) 
    SHRVTU(r) = VTUNDOC / {VOM("Servcs",r) + VTUNDOC}; 
Variable (all,i,TRAD_COMM)(all,r,REG) 
    tradslack(i,r) # slack variable in tradeables market clearing condition #; 
!   This is exogenous unless the user wishes to specify the price of tradeables exogenously, 
in which case the analysis becomes partial equilibrium and walraslack must be 
exogenized.   ! 
Equation MKTCLTRD_MARG 
# eq'n assures market clearing for margins commodities (HT 1) # 
(all,m,MARG_COMM)(all,r,NMEX_REG) 
    qo(m,r) 
        = SHRDM(m,r) * qds(m,r) 
        + SHRST(m,r) * qst(m,r) 
        + sum(s,REG, SHRXMD(m,r,s) * qxs(m,r,s)) 
        + tradslack(m,r); 
Equation MKTCLTRD_NMARG 
# eq'n assures market clearing for margins commodities (HT 1) # 
(all,m,NMARG_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG) 
    qo(m,r) 
        = SHRDM(m,r) * qds(m,r) 
        + SHRST(m,r) * qst(m,r) 




        + tradslack(m,r); 
Equation MKTCLTRD_SERVMEX 
(all,m,SERV_COMM)(all,r,MEX_REG) 
    qo(m,r) 
        = SHRDM(m,r) * qds(m,r) 
        + SHRST(m,r) * qst(m,r) 
        + sum(s,REG, SHRXMD(m,r,s) * qxs(m,r,s)) 
        + sum{j,PROD_COMM,SHRVTU(r)*qtundoc} 
        + tradslack(m,r); 
Variable (all,j,PROD_COMM) 
    qtunsec(j)  # qty migrant smuggle margin variable, Mex-US by sector using #; 
!   Technical change variables to be used in policy experiments that move undocumented 
workers at lower cost.   ! 
Variable 
    atundoc # tech change that augments qtundoc across all sectors #; 
Variable (all,j,PROD_COMM) 
    atunsec(j) # tech change that augments qtundoc by sector using#; 
!   This equation makes demand for smuggling services proportional to person movement. 
We introduce the potential for tech change like reform by adding the variable atundoc, a 
variable that when increased makes the movement of persons more efficient. In levels: 
ATUNDOC * QTUNDOC = Effective use of smuggling services. An increase in 
ATUNDOC's level causes less of the smuggling margin to be used to achieve the same 




Quantity variable to link to the movement of undocumented workers.   ! 
!   ELCHK - hard code matches current definitions for set elements   ! 
Equation EQTUNSEC 
# demand for smuggle services  # 
(all,j,PROD_COMM) 
    qtunsec(j) =  -atunsec(j) + qfue("unsklab","for","ileg",j,"USA"); 
Equation EQTUNDOC 
# demand for smuggle services, aggregate  # 
    qtundoc = sum(j,PROD_COMM, 
                    (VTUNSHR(j)/VTUNDOC) * qtunsec(j)); 
Equation EQATUNSEC 
# tech change in smuggling # 
(all,j,PROD_COMM) 
    atunsec(j) = atundoc; 
!   Supply of migrant margins is the supply of the services sector in Mexico. We augment 
the market clearing condition for Mexican services to account for the additional source of 
demand. The price paid for smuggling is the market price for services output.   ! 
Variable (all,j,PROD_COMM) 
    ptunsec(j) # price by sector for smuggling migrants#; 
Equation PTUNLINK (all,j,PROD_COMM) 
    ptunsec(j) = - atunsec(j) + pm("servcs","MEX"); 
 Equation EQAGGPTUN 




Variable pundoc_us # price of undocumented workers in US #; 
Coefficient (all,j,PROD_COMM) VFAUSHRS(j); 
Formula (all,j,PROD_COMM) 
    VFAUSHRS(j) = VFAU("unsklab","for","ileg",j,"USA")/ 
                      sum(jj,PROD_COMM, VFAU("unsklab","for","ileg",jj,"USA")); 
Equation EPUNDOC_US 
    pundoc_us = sum(j,PROD_COMM, VFAUSHRS(j) * 
                        pfue("unsklab","for","ileg",j,"USA")); 
!   Share weighted price linking equation: Mexican unskilled wage to US prices paid for 
unskilled, undocumented workers.   ! 
Coefficient SHRSMUG; 
Formula SHRSMUG = VTUNDOC / (VTUNDOC + 
             sum(jj,PROD_COMM, VFAU("unsklab","for","ileg",jj,"USA"))); 
Coefficient SHRLABC; 
Formula SHRLABC = 1 - SHRSMUG; 
Equation EWAGELINK 
    pundoc_us = SHRSMUG * ptundoc + SHRLABC * pm("unsklab","MEX"); 
 
